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1 
IF CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE, WHY CAN’T 
THEY PLAY TAG? 
Cody J. Jacobs* 
ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Burnham v. Superior 
Court—despite producing a splintered vote with no opinion 
garnering a majority of the Court—made one thing clear: an 
individual defendant can be subject to personal jurisdiction simply 
by being served with process while he or she happens to be in a 
forum regardless of whether the defendant has any contacts with 
that forum. This method of acquiring personal jurisdiction is 
called transient, or “tag,” jurisdiction. Tag jurisdiction is older 
than minimum contacts jurisdiction, and once was the primary 
method for determining whether an out of state defendant could be 
haled into a court. While Burnham held that tag jurisdiction 
remained constitutionally valid, the court split on the justification 
for allowing this form of jurisdiction, with four Justices approving 
the practice under an originalist methodology, and four others 
approving it based on contemporary notions of fairness. 
This Article argues that both the originalist and fairness-
based tests proposed in Burnham support allowing the assertion 
of tag jurisdiction over corporations and other entities through in-
state service on their officers. This Article shows that at the time 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, corporations were 
often subject to personal jurisdiction based only on their officers’ 
physical presence in a forum when served with process. The 
Article also demonstrates that the fairness considerations 
discussed in Burnham apply with even more force to modern 
corporations because of their greater ability to take advantage of 
the protections and services offered by states outside of their own. 
Finally, the Article examines how the application of tag 
jurisdiction to corporate entities would be in accord with general 
trends in constitutional law affording corporations rights 
equivalent to those of natural persons. 
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The paper also benefited from the excellent research assistance of Brian Sarama. This Article is dedicated 
to my daughter, Evann, who was born while it was being written. May you never accept that “life isn’t 
fair.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
A French citizen voluntarily travels to California to attend a conference. 
While there, he is properly served with a lawsuit by a California corporation. Even 
if he has no significant ties to California and the lawsuit is unrelated to any California 
conduct, there is no question under Burnham v. Superior Court1 that this hapless 
French citizen would be subject to personal jurisdiction in the California, simply by 
virtue of setting foot in California long enough to be served with process. 
Now imagine a different scenario. A French corporation’s vice president is 
attending a conference in California on behalf of the corporation. While in California 
the vice president is served with a lawsuit by an individual plaintiff. Like the scenario 
above, the lawsuit is unrelated to any California conduct and the Corporation has no 
significant ties to the forum. Unlike the unlucky French individual in the first 
scenario, the French corporation is not so clearly subject to personal jurisdiction. In 
fact, this second scenario describes the facts of Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, where 
the Ninth Circuit held that a French corporation—which allegedly manufactured and 
designed a defective plane that crashed, killing 68 people—could not be subject to 
personal jurisdiction in California even though its vice president was served in 
California.2 
Why is it that a corporation is allowed to come and go from a state with 
impunity but an individual risks being haled into court simply by stepping across the 
state line? This Article argues that corporations3 should be subject to “tag” 
jurisdiction by allowing the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a corporation in 
any forum where an officer is served while voluntarily present on the corporation’s 
behalf.4 Applying tag jurisdiction to corporations is consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning for applying it to individual persons. Tag jurisdiction also fits into 
the theoretical framework in modern constitutional law of corporations as entities 
with constitutional protections equal to natural persons. 
This Article will trace the history of tag jurisdiction, culminating in the 
Supreme Court’s split decision in Burnham endorsing that practice even in the age 
of modern “minimum contacts” jurisdictional analysis. Burnham laid out two 
competing due process justifications for the continuing vitality of tag jurisdiction. 
 
 1. 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
 2. 764 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 3. Although this Article mostly refers to corporations—which have been the subject of most 
litigation about this issue—the logic that would lead to the application of tag jurisdiction to corporations 
applies equally to other types of non-individual entities such as limited liability companies and 
partnerships. 
 4. Commentators and courts have also often used the phrase “transient jurisdiction” to describe this 
phenomenon. See, e.g., Burnham, 495 U.S. at 632–636, 638 (Brennan, J., concurring); Armand Paliotta, 
Jurisdiction: Burnham v. Superior Court: Adding Confusion to Transient Jurisdiction, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 
551 (1991); see also Joel H. Spitz, The “Transient Rule” of Personal Jurisdiction: A Well-Intentioned 
Concept That Has Overstayed Its Welcome, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 181 & n.3 (1989) (“The term ‘transient 
jurisdiction’ refers to jurisdiction over persons temporarily present in the forum. See R. WEINTRAUB, 
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 410 (3d ed. 1986).”). Other commentators have used other 
terminology. See, e.g., Bruce Posnak, A Uniform Approach to Judicial Jurisdiction After World-Wide and 
the Abolition of the “Gotcha” Theory, 30 EMORY L. J. 729 (1981) (referring to transient jurisdiction as 
the ‘Gotcha’ theory). This Article uses the phrases “tag jurisdiction” and “transient jurisdiction” 
interchangeably. 
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Those two justifications were based on the historical pedigree of tag jurisdiction and 
its inherent fairness. This article argues that both of these justifications strongly 
support the application of tag jurisdiction in the corporate context, because tag 
jurisdiction was frequently applied to corporations at the time of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ratification and because applying tag jurisdiction to corporations is at 
least as inherently fair as applying it to natural persons. 
The Article will also look at this issue through the lens of modern 
constitutional corporate personhood. Corporations have been afforded constitutional 
rights because they have been conceived of as the equivalent of natural people. 
Accordingly, corporate constitutional rights claims are almost never analyzed any 
differently than those of natural persons. This theoretical framework should entitle 
corporations to rights equal to those of natural persons—no more, no less. Yet, courts 
refusing to apply tag jurisdiction to corporations incongruously afford corporations 
greater protection under the Due Process Clause than natural persons. 
This Article begins in Part II with an overview of the history of tag 
jurisdiction and the Court’s modern personal jurisdiction doctrine, and an 
examination of the two principal opinions in Burnham. Part III will argue that the 
justifications for tag jurisdiction offered in Burnham strongly support the application 
of tag jurisdiction to corporations. Part IV will survey and critique the lower court 
decisions addressing whether corporations are subject to tag jurisdiction after 
Burnham. Part V will explain how applying tag jurisdiction to corporations is 
consistent with the recent treatment of corporations as equivalent to natural persons 
in other areas of constitutional law. 
I. MODERN PERSONAL JURISDICTION DOCTRINE: RUNNING AWAY 
FROM TAG AND BACK AGAIN 
A court’s ability to exercise jurisdiction over a person, i.e. in personam 
jurisdiction, was historically based on a simple idea: a court may exercises 
jurisdiction over any person physically present in the forum.5 Over the last seventy 
years — partly in response to technological and social changes that made it easier 
for corporations to do business in multiple places at once —courts have adopted and 
expanded alternative ways to assert jurisdiction over people and companies who are 
not physically present in the forum when served with process, but nevertheless have 
some level of minimum contacts with the jurisdiction that justify the assertion of the 
court’s authority over that person or company. However, in Burnham, the Court 
 
 5. See, e.g., Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610–11 (“Among the most firmly established principles of 
personal jurisdiction in American tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents 
who are physically present in the State. The view developed early that each State had the power to hale 
before its courts any individual who could be found within its borders, and that once having acquired 
jurisdiction over such a person by properly serving him with process, the State could retain jurisdiction to 
enter judgment against him, no matter how fleeting his visit. See, e.g., Potter v. Allin, 2 Root 63, 67 (Conn. 
1793); Barrell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354 (1819). That view had antecedents in English common-law 
practice, which sometimes allowed ‘transitory’ actions, arising out of events outside the country, to be 
maintained against seemingly nonresident defendants who were present in England.”); Pennoyer v. Neff, 
95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (noting the “well-established principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction 
of an independent State over persons and property . . . that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction 
and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory”). 
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made clear that this minimum contacts analysis was intended to supplement 
traditional in personam jurisdiction based on physical presence, not to replace it 
entirely.6 
A.  Modern Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine: Away From Tag, Towards 
Minimum Contacts 
Prior to 1877, the question of personal jurisdiction was solely focused on 
physical presence.7 Under this rule, courts could assert personal jurisdiction over any 
person who consented to jurisdiction,8 voluntarily entered an appearance, had 
property in the state, or was served while physically present in a state.9 A court was 
able to acquire jurisdiction over a defendant who was served in a forum regardless 
of whether the defendant’s presence in the forum was related to the litigation or 
whether the duration of the defendant’s stay in the forum was lengthy or brief.10 The 
only limitation was that courts would not assert jurisdiction over a defendant who 
was served while physically present in a jurisdiction due to force, fraud, or in order 
to be a party or witness in another judicial proceeding — in other words, the 
defendant had to be voluntarily present in the forum in order for personal jurisdiction 
to arise from service.11 
In Pennoyer v. Neff, the Court constitutionalized these traditional principles 
of jurisdiction, holding that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident 
defendant who was only served by means of publication was improper under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the defendant had not 
consented to jurisdiction in the state, voluntarily appeared, or been served with 
process in the state.12 Thus, this rather formalistic approach to jurisdiction became a 
 
 6. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619. 
 7. But see Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From 
Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 25–32 (1990) (noting that “Supreme 
Court intervention in state court assertions of personal jurisdiction did not, as one may sometimes gather, 
begin with Pennoyer” and recounting several jurisdictional cases the Court decided in the context of the 
interstate recognition of judgments). 
 8. Consent was—even in this period—often understood fairly broadly to encompass situations 
where state laws implied the consent of defendants who choose to conduct business in a state or even 
drive on a state’s roads. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction 
Doctrine in a Twenty First Century World, FLA. L. REV. 387, 391 n.13 (2012) (listing methods that a 
defendant could consent to jurisdiction during the nineteenth century, illustrating that—even in this 
period—consent was often understood fairly broadly to encompass situations where state laws implied 
the consent of defendants who chose to conduct business in a state); Borchers, supra note 7, at 29 
(discussing a pre-Pennoyer example of the “fictionalized notion of ‘consent’” that “would come to be the 
centerpiece of the [Supreme] Court’s jurisdictional jurisprudence” several decades later.) 
 9. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 7, at 32. 
 10. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 612–13 (collecting cases). 
 11. See id. at 613. 
 12. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). See Borchers, supra note 7, at 38–43 (suggesting 
that Pennoyer was a bit ambiguous and that Pennoyer could have been read narrowly—to only provide a 
Fourteenth Amendment right to challenge a state court judgment collaterally to ensure that the state’s 
jurisdictional rules were complied with, rather than to create any substantive limitations on the states’ 
ability to set their own jurisdictional rules); see also Burnham, 495 U.S. at 616–17 (“Pennoyer v. Neff, 
while renowned for its statement of the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits such an 
exercise of jurisdiction, in fact set that forth only as dictum and decided the case . . . under ‘well-
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real limit on the authority of courts. However, in practice, this approach proved less 
rigid then it initially appeared. In the years that followed Pennoyer, the Court 
stretched the definition of “consent” to allow the assertion of personal jurisdiction 
over defendants who were not actually served within a state’s borders by approving 
statutory schemes that implied consent from certain activities such as doing business 
within a state.13 
By the middle of the twentieth century, the Court decided to depart from 
this fiction altogether in the landmark case of International Shoe v. Washington.14 In 
that case, the Court held for the first time that the Due Process Clause requires “only 
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present 
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.’”15 The Court explicitly recharacterized its earlier opinions 
expanding the scope of “consent” as instances where a defendant’s contacts with a 
state were sufficient to give rise to personal jurisdiction.16 International Shoe’s 
expansion of courts’ ability to assert jurisdiction over non-physically present 
defendants was largely a response to the advances in communications and 
transportation technologies that allowed people — and in particular companies — to 
conduct business over state lines with relative ease.17 
Over the years following International Shoe, the Court refined the 
boundaries of this new method of acquiring personal jurisdiction over non-present 
defendants. The Court eventually developed two different ways to assert jurisdiction 
over such defendants: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.18 A court may 
assert general jurisdiction only when the defendant has such “continuous and 
systematic [contacts] as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”19 
 
established principles of public law.’”). See Borchers, supra note 7, at 50–51 (noting that over the next 
few decades, the ambiguity was resolved in favor of the broader reading of Pennoyer, firmly establishing 
the Due Process Clause as a substantive limitation on states’ ability to exercise personal jurisdiction); see, 
e.g., Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 195–97 (1915). 
 13. See, e.g., Burnham, 495 U.S. at 617–18; see also supra note 8. 
 14. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 15. Id. at 316. 
 16. See id. at 318–19; Rhodes, supra note 8, at 398–99. 
 17. See, e.g., Warren B. Chik, U.S. Jurisdictional Rules of Adjudication over Business Conducted 
Via the Internet—Guidelines and A Checklist for the E-Commerce Merchant, 10 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 243, 250 n.28 (2002); Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum 
Shopping and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 779–80, 
782–83 (1995) (noting that with the refinement of the corporate form and easier methods of travel 
“[c]orporations proved particularly troublesome” to courts in the post-Pennoyer, pre-International Shoe 
era by making it difficult to secure jurisdiction over them in states where they may cause harm). But see 
Logan Everett Sawyer III, Jurisdiction, Jurisprudence, and Legal Change: Sociological Jurisprudence 
and the Road to International Shoe, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 62 (2001) (“[T]he decision [in 
International Shoe] did not result simply from the expansion of interstate business or the inherent 
weakness of the Pennoyer system. Instead, International Shoe was caused primarily by the emergence of 
a new conception of the law and the role of the judge. It was only because judges saw the law through the 
lenses of sociological jurisprudence and legal realism that judges believed International Shoe was 
necessary to address interstate corporate activity.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). 
 19. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014). 
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Once the existence of such contacts is established, a court may assert jurisdiction 
over a defendant for any cause of action, even one not related to the defendant’s 
contacts with that forum.20 
Specific jurisdiction on the other hand, the far more litigated type of 
jurisdiction,21 arises when the defendant’s contacts with the forum gave rise to the 
cause of action.22 In assessing whether a court may exercise specific jurisdiction, a 
court looks at whether the defendant “‘purposefully directed’ his activities at 
residents of the forum” and whether the litigation “arise[s] out of or relate[s] to those 
activities.”23 Even if such purposefully created contacts exist, and those contacts are 
sufficiently connected to the cause of action, personal jurisdiction still may only be 
asserted when it is consistent with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.”24 This analysis depends on “an evaluation of several factors,” including “the 
burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, . . . the plaintiff’s interest 
in obtaining relief[,] the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most 
efficient resolution of controversies[,] and the shared interest of the several States in 
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”25 
At first, the Supreme Court used these formulations to expand the scope of 
state authority to subject non-resident corporations to personal jurisdiction.26 
However, beginning in the late 1970s, the Court pared back the growth of minimum 
contacts-based jurisdiction primarily by requiring a greater level of purposeful 
availment on the part of defendants—especially corporate defendants—to subject 
themselves to jurisdiction in a particular forum.27 
B.  Burnham: Back To Tag Again, But Why? 
Importantly, tag jurisdiction falls outside of the minimum contacts 
framework of specific or general jurisdiction. Its exercise does not turn on whether 
the defendant’s contacts with the state are systematic, related to the cause of action, 
or whether those contacts are purposeful. Instead, it depends only upon whether the 
defendant was served while voluntarily physically present in the jurisdiction. During 
the entire period after International Shoe when the Court was developing the 
minimum contacts doctrine, the Court was conspicuously silent on whether tag 
jurisdiction remained valid. 
 
 20. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). 
 21. See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 630 (1988). 
 22. See, e.g., Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. 
 23. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (citation omitted); accord Hanson v. 
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“[I]t is essential in each case [to support the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction] that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”). 
 24. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) 
(quotations omitted) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316). 
 25. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 
(1980)). 
 26. See, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 8, at 400–01 & n.73 (collecting cases). 
 27. See Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: The Ironic Legacy of 
Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 551, 562 (2012) (“In the ten remaining personal jurisdiction cases of the 
twentieth century—after Hanson and through 1990—the Court would reject jurisdiction in seven.”). 
2016 IF CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE, WHY CAN'T THEY PLAY TAG? 7 
In the absence of any indication to the contrary, courts continued to 
recognize tag jurisdiction as a valid method of obtaining personal jurisdiction over 
non-resident defendants even after International Shoe.28 These courts saw 
International Shoe as a vehicle for expanding jurisdiction rather than contracting it, 
and held that it only applied to situations involving substituted service where the 
non-resident is not present in the forum.29 In perhaps the most vivid illustration of 
the viability of this traditional form of jurisdiction in the modern world, a federal 
district court in Arkansas upheld the assertion of jurisdiction over a non-resident 
defendant who was simply in a plane flying over Arkansas when he was served with 
process.30 
However, when the Court finally offered a clue of which direction it was 
heading on the issue, it appeared to signal that tag jurisdiction was on its way out. In 
Shaffer v. Heitner,31 a six Justice majority held that the physical presence of property 
in a state was insufficient to justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant in the absence of minimum purposeful contacts with the forum by 
the defendant and a showing that asserting jurisdiction was consistent with 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.32 Thus, even when the 
defendant’s property is present in a state, “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction 
must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its 
progeny.”33 The Court reached this conclusion after recognizing that the assertion of 
jurisdiction over property — although it has a long historical pedigree — is really 
just an assertion of jurisdiction over the property’s owner.34 The Court concluded 
that this fiction “supports an ancient form without substantial modern justification” 
and “[i]ts continued acceptance would serve only to allow state-court jurisdiction 
that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant.”35 
The Court’s virtually unanimous36 willingness to put an end to traditional 
in-rem jurisdiction led many commentators to predict the demise of tag jurisdiction 
 
 28. See, e.g., Donald Manter Co. v. Davis, 543 F.2d 419, 420 (1st Cir. 1976) (citations omitted) (“It 
has long been black letter law that personal service within its geographical area establishes a court’s 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The cases relied upon by defendant discussing ‘fairness,’ etc., 
allegedly contra, are directed either to the fairness of the basis for substituted service when an individual 
was not personally served or present within the area, or to the fairness of subjecting a foreign intangible 
entity, such as a corporation, to the jurisdiction of the court. See, e. g., Hanson v. Denckla, . . . ; 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington. . . . The concern, in other words, was with expanding jurisdiction 
beyond traditional limits, not with contracting it.”); Nielsen v. Braland, 119 N.W.2d 737, 738 (1963) 
(“This case involves service on an individual defendant within the State of Minnesota of a summons in a 
transitory cause of action. The cases relied upon by defendant involve the amenability of a foreign 
defendant to jurisdiction in personam by substituted service. . . . Where the defendant is present within 
the state, except when exempt from service, and is personally served, the court acquires jurisdiction in 
personam regardless of the fact that he is a nonresident.”). 
 29. See, e.g., Donald Manter, 543 F.2d at 420. 
 30. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 442–47 (E.D. Ark. 1959). 
 31. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 32. Id. at 212. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Six Members of the Court joined the majority opinion. Id. at 189. See also id. at 217–19 (Stevens, 
J., concurring) (appearing to agree that the simple presence of property alone in a state was insufficient to 
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as well.37 These scholars argued that Shaffer essentially severed the connection 
between a state’s physical power over the property and people within its borders and 
its ability to exercise jurisdiction.38 By replacing a traditional focus on physical 
power with the modern International Shoe test in the context of dealings with 
property, the Court appeared to be preparing to make a similar shift with respect to 
people.39 Nevertheless, most lower courts continued to adhere to traditional tag 
jurisdiction even after Shaffer.40 Thus, the stage was set for the Supreme Court to 
resolve the divide between scholars and courts when the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in a case involving a New Jersey resident with no significant ties to 
California who was served with a court summons and divorce petition during a brief 
visit to California.41 
Despite all the hype, the Justices agreed unanimously that tag jurisdiction 
generally remained valid.42 However, they sharply disagreed on the rationale for that 
holding, with no opinion managing to garner five votes. Justice Scalia, writing in 
large part for four Justices,43 applied an originalist44 methodology. He began with a 
discussion of the long historical pedigree of transient jurisdiction, tracing its lineage 
back to English common law practice as early as the late seventeenth century.45 
Justice Scalia noted that under this practice: 
 
confer personal jurisdiction in the absence of some kind of procedure for notifying property owners that 
such ownership subjected them to potential jurisdiction); id. at 219 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (agreeing with the Court that “the minimum-contacts analysis developed in 
International Shoe” should govern the assertion of state-court jurisdiction even when property is owned 
by the defendant in the forum state, but disagreeing with the Court’s application of the International Shoe 
analysis to the facts of the case); id. at 216 (noting that then-Justice Rehnquist recused himself from the 
case). 
 37. See, e.g., Daniel O. Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of in 
Personam Jurisdiction?, 25 VILL. L. REV. 38, 66 (1979) (“But if due process means fairness based on the 
existence of minimum contacts between the defendant, the litigation, and the forum, then it would appear 
that in personam jurisdiction, grounded solely upon mere physical presence, is inconsistent with the 
holding of Shaffer and should, therefore, be laid to rest.”); see also Douglas A. Mays, Note, Burnham v. 
Superior Court: The Supreme Court Agrees on Transient Jurisdiction in Practice, but Not in Theory, 69 
N.C. L. REV. 1271, 1271 n.5, 1283 n.104 (1991) (collecting sources); Earl M. Maltz, Sovereign Authority, 
Fairness, and Personal Jurisdiction: The Case for the Doctrine of Transient Jurisdiction, 66 WASH. 
U.L.Q. 671, 674 n.13 (1988) (collecting sources). 
 38. See, e.g., Bernstine, supra note 37, at 52–53, 61–62. 
 39. See, e.g., id. at 61–62. 
 40. See Paul C. Wilson, A Pedigree for Due Process? Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 56 
MO. L. REV. 353, 366 (1991); B. Glenn George, In Search of General Jurisdiction, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1097, 
1117 n.78 (1990). 
 41. See Wilson, supra note 40, at 366 (noting the “nearly unanimous voice [of] scholars [who] had 
counseled an end to” tag jurisdiction before Burnham was decided and the “equally unanimous voice [of] 
state and lower federal courts” in upholding the doctrine). 
 42. See Burnham v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 607 (1990) (Scalia, J., plurality); id. at 628–29 
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 43. See id. at 607 (noting that Justice Scalia’s opinion was joined in its entirety by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, and joined in large part by Justice White). 
 44. See Liang Kan, Comment, A Theory of Justice Souter, 45 EMORY L.J. 1373, 1379–80 (1996) 
(describing Justice Scalia’s opinion as purporting to be based on the original understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 45. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610–11. 
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[E]ach State had the power to hale before its courts any individual 
who could be found within its borders, and that once having 
acquired jurisdiction over such a person by properly serving him 
with process, the State could retain jurisdiction to enter judgment 
against him, no matter how fleeting his visit.46 
It was against this backdrop that Justice Scalia analyzed and rejected the 
petitioner’s arguments for departing from this tradition. First, Justice Scalia 
characterized International Shoe as merely holding that “the defendant’s litigation-
related ‘minimum contacts’ may take the place of physical presence as the basis for 
jurisdiction[.]”47 The minimum contacts test “was developed by analogy to ‘physical 
presence,’ and it would be perverse to say it could now be turned against that 
touchstone of jurisdiction.”48 
Next, in a portion of his opinion joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia rejected the argument that Shaffer required the 
abandonment of tag jurisdiction.49 Justice Scalia argued that “Shaffer, like 
International Shoe, involved jurisdiction over an absent defendant, and it stands for 
nothing more than the proposition that when the ‘minimum contact’ that is a 
substitute for physical presence consists of property ownership it must, like other 
minimum contacts, be related to the litigation.”50 Justice Scalia dismissed Shaffer’s 
seemingly clear statement that “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be 
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its 
progeny”51 as simply a statement that 
quasi in rem jurisdiction . . . and in personam jurisdiction, are 
really one and the same and must be treated alike—leading to the 
conclusion that quasi in rem jurisdiction, i.e., that form of in 
personam jurisdiction based upon a ‘property ownership’ contact 
and by definition unaccompanied by personal, in-state service, 
must satisfy the litigation-relatedness requirement of International 
Shoe.52 
Thus, “[t]he logic of Shaffer’s holding—which places all suits against absent 
nonresidents on the same constitutional footing, regardless of whether a separate 
Latin label is attached to one particular basis of contact—does not compel the 
 
 46. Id. See id. at 611 (admitting that recent scholarship had called into question how firmly rooted 
that English tradition actually was). But see id. (noting that whether that perception of history was accurate 
or not, it was the perception that was “shared by American courts at the crucial time for present purposes: 
1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted”). 
 47. Id. at 618 (emphasis added). 
 48. Id. at 619. 
 49. See id. at 619–20 (characterizing this point as petitioner’s “strongest argument,” perhaps 
suggesting Justice Scalia’s underlying disagreement with Shaffer). See also Burnham, 495 U.S. at 621–
22, 621 n.4 (admitting that “[i]t is fair to say, however, that while our holding today does not contradict 
Shaffer, our basic approach to the due process question is different” and asserting that Shaffer “may have 
involved a unique state procedure” for acquiring in rem jurisdiction). 
 50. Id. at 620. 
 51. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977). 
 52. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 620–21. 
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conclusion that physically present defendants must be treated identically to absent 
ones.”53 
The core of the disagreement among the Members of the Court in Burnham 
was whether tradition alone could justify the continuation of tag jurisdiction. Justice 
Brennan’s opinion for four justices,54 while agreeing with Justice Scalia that “the 
Due Process Clause . . . generally permits a state court to exercise jurisdiction over 
a defendant if he is served with process while voluntarily present in the 
forum[,]”sharply disagreed with the idea that tradition should be “the only factor” in 
determining whether a jurisdictional rule satisfies due process requirements.55 
Instead, Justice Brennan proposed an “independent inquiry into the . . . fairness of 
the” rule being evaluated.56 
Justice Brennan argued that the originalist approach suggested in Justice 
Scalia’s opinion was inconsistent with the Court’s decisions in Shaffer and 
International Shoe, with the former casting off a traditionally valid form of 
jurisdiction and the latter allowing an expansion of jurisdiction not supported by 
tradition.57 Instead, Justice Brennan proposed that tradition should be just one factor 
in a larger fairness inquiry.58 
Applying that fairness analysis to tag jurisdiction, Justice Brennan first 
noted that, because tag jurisdiction was a longstanding tradition59 in the United 
States, defendants were on notice that they may be subject to jurisdiction in a forum 
by physically entering it.60 Justice Brennan further noted that a person avails himself 
of significant benefits of a forum simply by choosing to enter it, including gaining 
access to the state’s emergency services, roads, and “the fruits of the State’s 
economy[.]”61 The opinion also argued that “[w]ithout transient jurisdiction, an 
asymmetry would arise: A transient would have the full benefit of the power of the 
forum State’s courts as a plaintiff while retaining immunity from their authority as a 
defendant.”62 Finally, the opinion found the exercise of jurisdiction over transient 
defendants fair because of advances in transportation and communications 
technology that make it easier for a non-resident to defend themselves in a foreign 
forum, particularly one that non-resident already visited at least once when he or she 
was served with process.63 
 
 53. Id. at 621. 
 54. Id. at 628 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that Justice Brennan’s opinion was joined by Justice 
Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice O’Connor). 
 55. Id. at 628–29 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 56. Id. at 629. 
 57. See id. at 629–33. 
 58. See id. at 633. 
 59. See id. at 634–35 & nn.9–10 (noting that Justice Brennan taking issue with Justice Scalia’s 
characterization of the history of tag jurisdiction by stating “for much of the 19th century, American courts 
did not uniformly recognize the concept of transient jurisdiction, and it appears that the transient rule did 
not receive wide currency until well after our decision in Pennoyer v. Neff . . . “). 
 60. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 636–37 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. at 637–38. 
 62. Id. at 638. 
 63. Id. at 638–39. 
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Justice Scalia, in a different portion of his opinion joined by only two other 
Justices,64 strongly defended relying entirely on tradition in determining the validity 
of jurisdictional rules. He argued that Justice Brennan’s proposal was overly 
subjective and would essentially come down to “each Justice’s subjective assessment 
of what is fair and just.”65 Instead, Justice Scalia concluded that “[t]he ‘contemporary 
notions of due process’ applicable to personal jurisdiction are the enduring 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ established as the test by 
International Shoe” and that this test is satisfied whenever lower courts “adhere[] to 
jurisdictional rules that are generally applied and have always been applied in the 
United States.”66 
Justice Stevens deprived either side of a majority-making fifth vote67 with 
a brief enigmatic concurrence that expressed concern about the “unnecessarily broad 
reach” of both primary opinions.68 
None of the opinions discussed any distinctions between natural persons 
and corporations, except for one footnote in Justice Scalia’s opinion: 
We have said that “[e]ven when the cause of action does not arise 
out of or relate to the foreign corporation’s activities in the forum 
State, due process is not offended by a State’s subjecting the 
corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are 
sufficient contacts between the State and the foreign corporation.” 
Our only holding supporting that statement, however, involved 
“regular service of summons upon [the corporation’s] president 
while he was in [the forum State] acting in that capacity.” See 
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 440, 
72 S.Ct. 413, 415, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952). It may be that whatever 
special rule exists permitting “continuous and systematic” 
contacts, id., at 438, 72 S.Ct., at 414, to support jurisdiction with 
respect to matters unrelated to activity in the forum applies only to 
corporations, which have never fitted comfortably in a 
jurisdictional regime based primarily upon “de facto power over 
the defendant’s person.” We express no views on these matters—
 
 64. Id. at 608–609 (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined this portion of 
Justice Scalia’s opinion). 
 65. Id. at 623. 
 66. Id. at 622–23. 
 67. Id. at 628 (White, J., concurring) (joining Justice Scalia’s opinion in substantial part, but also 
writing a separate concurrence (for himself only), suggesting that he believes the Court may have authority 
to declare traditionally accepted procedures invalid under the Due Process Clause, but only where there 
has been a showing “that as a general proposition the rule is so arbitrary and lacking in common sense in 
so many instances that it should be held violative of due process in every case”). 
 68. Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring); see Mays, supra note 37, at 1278 n.68 (describing Justice 
Stevens’ concurrence in Burnham as “a short and somewhat enigmatic opinion”); see also Winton D. 
Woods, Burnham v. Superior Court: New Wine, Old Bottles, 13 GEORGE MASON U. L. REV. 199, 209 n.30 
(1990) (“Justice Stevens thus continues his practice in close cases of the jurisdictional kind by refusing to 
join with anybody’s theory. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) 
(Stevens, J., concurring); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).”). 
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and, for simplicity’s sake, omit reference to this aspect of 
“contacts”-based jurisdiction in our discussion.69 
In this footnote, Justice Scalia does not really get at the central question of whether 
corporations should be subject to tag jurisdiction or not, but instead suggests that 
individuals may not ever be subject to general jurisdiction based on systematic and 
continuous contacts outside of their home state, even though this method of asserting 
jurisdiction is applicable to corporations. Thus, this footnote offers no guidance on 
the relationship between tag jurisdiction and corporations and even explicitly 
disclaims expressing any “views” on the issue it does purport to address. 
Nevertheless, as discussed in Part IV, infra, lower courts have frequently contorted 
this footnote to avoid applying tag jurisdiction to corporations. 
II. TAGGING CORPORATIONS: AN IDEA BOTH SIDES OF BURNHAM 
CAN EMBRACE 
Burnham does not directly answer the question of whether tag jurisdiction 
applies to corporations; however, it does provide two methods of analysis to apply 
to that question. As discussed above, Burnham’s two principal opinions gave 
different justifications for the continuing vitality of tag jurisdiction: Justice Scalia’s 
opinion relied on the well-established historical pedigree of tag jurisdiction, while 
Justice Brennan relied on the inherent fairness of tag jurisdiction.70 While these 
methods of analysis are worlds apart when it comes to their larger implications for 
the Due Process Clause, they should both yield the same result here: tag jurisdiction 
should apply to business entities just as it applies to individuals. 
A.  Historical Justifications 
Under Justice Scalia’s method of analysis in Burnham, to determine 
whether a procedure for securing personal jurisdiction violates the Due Process 
Clause, courts must look to “the principles traditionally followed by American courts 
in marking out the territorial limits of each State’s authority.”71 The most “crucial 
time” for the purposes of establishing what principals were “traditionally followed” 
by American courts with respect to personal jurisdiction is the period around “1868, 
when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.”72 Under this originalist approach, 
as long as a practice was common around the time of ratification, it is constitutional, 
even if the practice was less common prior to the ratification period.73 If a practice 
is sufficiently “traditional” by this metric, then no further analysis is necessary and 
due process is satisfied.74 However, if a practice is not so traditional, then it must be 
justified by an analysis of whether it comports with “traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.”75 
 
 69. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610 n.1 (some citations omitted). 
 70. See supra Part II.B. 
 71. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 609. 
 72. Id. at 611. 
 73. See id. at 609–16. 
 74. Id. at 622. 
 75. Id. 
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Applying this test to the assertion of tag jurisdiction over corporations 
shows that this practice—although not as old as asserting tag jurisdiction over 
individual defendants—was, in fact, fairly common at the time of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ratification. By that time, courts had already been engaged in several 
decades of expansion of jurisdiction over out of state corporations. This expansion 
went on two tracks. One is a familiar one where if a corporation conducted a 
sufficient amount of business in a state, it was considered “present” there for 
purposes of jurisdiction. 
The other method is less well known, but was equally part of jurisdiction 
jurisprudence at that time: the idea that a corporation was subject to a forum’s 
jurisdiction if its agent was served while engaged in corporate business there. This 
latter line of reasoning—present in several cases both before and after ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment—places the assertion of tag jurisdiction over 
corporations among those methods of acquiring personal jurisdiction “traditionally 
followed” by American courts under Justice Scalia’s Burnham opinion. 
1. Corporations Leave Home 
Early in American history, corporations for the most part, were deemed to 
be present for jurisdictional purposes in only one place: their place of incorporation.76 
However, as interstate commerce and the role of corporations in American society 
grew, courts expanded the concept of corporate presence further, to prevent the 
inequitable result of allowing a corporation to do business in and utilize the courts 
of other fora without subjecting corporations to personal jurisdiction in those fora.77 
One line of cases expanded the concept of corporate presence into what 
eventually became the International Shoe minimum contacts test. These cases 
analogized “doing business” in a state to the corporation being present in a state.78 
This was the beginning of the idea of constructive presence; if a corporation was 
conducting a certain level of commerce in a state, it could be considered “present” 
 
 76. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 354 (1882) (“Formerly it was held that a foreign 
corporation could not be sued in an action for the recovery of a personal demand outside of the state by 
which it was chartered.”); Middlebrooks v. Springfield Fire Ins. Co., 14 Conn. 301, 305 (1841) (“By the 
common law, there is no process which can be served . . . upon foreign corporations, by which their 
appearance can be compelled in any court; for the reason, that [such corporations have] no corporate 
existence within [the state].  . . .”); GERARD CARL HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN 
CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 77–79 (1918) (“Until toward the middle of the 
[nineteenth] century, the idea seems to have been widely prevalent that foreign attachment was the only 
process available against [non-resident corporations].  . . .”); see also Steven Mathew Wald, Note, The 
Left-for-Dead Fiction of Corporate “Presence”: Is It Revived by Burnham?, 54 LA. L. REV. 187, 188 
(1993) (footnote omitted) (“At the time of Pennoyer v. Neff, corporations were deemed to be present at 
their place of incorporation.”). 
 77. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 76, at 188–89; J.P.T., Annotation, Service of Process upon Agent of 
Foreign Corporation in Action Based on Transactions Outside the State, 30 AM. L. REP. 255 (1924) 
(citations omitted) (“Following the rule of the common law the early American cases held that a 
corporation was suable only in the courts of the sovereignty by which it was created. The rule was 
established at a time when the law relating to municipal corporations applied also to private corporations; 
the rule obviously could not maintain itself after the enormous growth of private corporations, and the 
extension of corporate activity into foreign jurisdictions.”). 
 78. See, e.g., Twitchell, supra note 21, at 621–22, 622 nn.56–58. 
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for jurisdictional purposes whether or not one of its agents was served while 
physically present in the forum.79 
However, another distinct line of reasoning expanded the concept of 
corporate presence based on the physical presence of corporate agents. This line of 
reasoning arose in conjunction with the relatively new idea that corporations could 
act at all outside of their place of incorporation.80 These courts held that a corporation 
could be considered physically present for service of process purposes when one of 
its agents was conducting business on the corporation’s behalf in the forum. Such 
service was then sufficient to give courts of the forum personal jurisdiction over the 
corporation. Although this line of cases is often conflated with the rise of the 
constructive presence theory, they actually represent an entirely distinct way of 
asserting jurisdiction over corporations: One based on traditional notions of 
territorial power. These cases reflect that asserting tag jurisdiction over corporations 
is nearly as firmly rooted in our legal history as asserting tag jurisdiction over 
individuals. 
As early as 1838, some courts were already asserting personal jurisdiction 
over corporations outside of their place of incorporation—and doing so on the basis 
of in-state service. In Libbey v. Hodgdon,81 the New Hampshire Superior Court of 
Judicature82 allowed the assertion of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
corporation based on service on one of that corporation’s employees while in the 
forum state on the corporation’s behalf.83 The court’s reasoning drew a direct parallel 
to the assertion of tag jurisdiction over natural persons: 
If a citizen of another state is found here, and process is served on 
him personally, that gives the court jurisdiction. It may well be 
doubted, however, whether the casual presence of the principal 
officer of a foreign corporation here, and service upon him, would 
be sufficient. But if the corporation have estate here — or if it send 
its officer, upon whom by our law process is to be served, to reside 
here and transact business upon its account, we see not why an 
attachment of such estate, or service upon such officer, may not be 
sufficient.84 
Thus, although service during a “casual visit”—that is, one for purposes unconnected 
to the corporation—by an officer to a state might be insufficient to confer 
jurisdiction, service during a visit made for the purpose of conducting corporate 
business is as valid a vehicle for asserting personal jurisdiction over the corporation 
as in-state service on an individual. 
 
 79. See id. at 622 & n.61. 
 80. See Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come with Responsibilities: Personal Jurisdiction in the Age of 
Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125, 136 & n.40, 137 & n.48 (2013); see also infra Part V. 
 81. 9 N.H. 394 (1838). 
 82. See Charles G. Douglas, III & Jay Surdukowski, The New Hampshire Supreme Court: A History 
of Change, N.H.B.J., Winter 2010, at 10, 11 (describing the New Hampshire Superior Court of Judicature 
as New Hampshire’s highest appellate court in 1838). 
 83. Libbey, 9 N.H. at 396–97. 
 84. Id. 
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Decades later, in 1870, after a few more courts had followed suit,85 the 
United States Supreme Court also began allowing the assertion of jurisdiction over 
non-resident corporations based on service of process upon corporate agents. That 
year, the Court decided Railroad Co. v. Harris,86 where it allowed the exercise of 
jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation in the District of Columbia, where the 
corporation’s president was served in the District.87 Arguably, there is some 
ambiguity as to whether in-forum service was critical to the Court’s analysis since 
the Court also observed that the corporation was conducting business in the District 
(by running a railroad there) and that the statute authorizing the corporation’s 
operation in the District impliedly required that the corporation be amenable to suit 
there.88 Nevertheless, the Court was squarely presented with the argument that 
service on the corporation’s president was insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the 
corporation and rejected it without the benefit of the “minimum contacts” analysis, 
which was still several decades away.89 Moreover, although Harris was not a 
constitutional case, it strongly suggests that the Court saw no constitutional problem 
with exercising jurisdiction in this manner since it was decided just two years after 
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.90 
2. The Difference Between Constructive & Actual Presence 
After Pennoyer, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of asserting 
personal jurisdiction over corporations through its agents more explicitly in St. Clair 
v. Cox.91 There, the Court held that the rule announced in Pennoyer applied equally 
to the assertion of personal jurisdiction over corporations.92 However, the Court 
noted that there was one key difference between corporations and natural persons: 
“[a] corporation, being an artificial being, can act only through agents, and only 
through them can be reached, and process must, therefore, be served upon them.”93 
Although the Court acknowledged that historically corporate officers could only 
receive service of process on behalf of the corporation in the state of incorporation, 
the Court approved the requirement that a corporation appoint an agent to accept 
service of process, as a condition of doing business in a state.94 The Court reasoned 
 
 85. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Savage Mining Co., 23 F. Cas. 1113, 1123 (C.C.D. Nev. 1867) (No. 
13,986) (“If the corporation exercise powers in this state, it must do so through an officer or agent. If this 
officer or agent be competent to represent the corporation here in making contracts and holding property, 
why may he not be said to represent it when the enforcement of its liabilities is sought?”). 
 86. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 65 (1870). 
 87. Id. at 69, 71, 83–84. 
 88. See id. at 83–84. 
 89. See id. at 71, 83–84. 
 90. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 612–13 (citing many cases that pre-dated Pennoyer and that do not 
explicitly invoke constitutional limitations on jurisdiction, but rather rely on general common law and/or 
statutory principles); see also id. at 609 (“American courts invalidated, or denied recognition to, 
judgments [where the court lacked personal jurisdiction] long before the Fourteenth Amendment was 
adopted.”) (collecting cases); supra note 12 (noting that in the years immediately following Pennoyer, not 
all courts understood it as establishing the broad constitutional rule it is known for today). 
 91. 106 U.S. 350 (1882). 
 92. Id. at 353. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 355–56. 
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that “[s]erving process on [a corporation’s] agents in other states, for matters within 
the sphere of their agency, is, in effect, servicing process on it as much so as if such 
agents resided in the state where it was created.”95 Although the Court was approving 
a narrower consent-based practice, its acknowledgement that a corporation can 
“travel” for jurisdictional purposes from its home to another state by sending its agent 
there supports applying tag jurisdiction to corporations. 
Crucially, although the Court in St. Clair makes reference to the concept of 
“doing business” in the forum, it did so in the context of discussing the type of agency 
relationship that must exist for the proper assertion of jurisdiction, not in the context 
of anything resembling a modern “contacts” analysis. The Court held—in construing 
a Michigan statute authorizing service on non-resident corporate officers—that 
“service upon an agent of a foreign corporation will not be deemed sufficient unless 
he represents the corporation in the state. This representation implies that the 
corporation does business, or has business in the state for the transaction of which it 
sends or appoints an agent there.”96 Thus, the Court was not asserting that a certain 
quantum of “business” must be conducted in the forums for the court to acquire 
jurisdiction, but rather that the agent of the corporation who is served in the forum 
must be there for the purpose of conducting some kind of corporate business in the 
forum. 
Although St. Clair involved a statute requiring the appointment of an agent, 
the existence of such a statute was not required to hale a corporation into court based 
on in-state service on a corporate agent doing business in a forum. The South 
Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in Lipe v. Carolina, Clinchfield & Ohio Railway 
Co.97is illustrative of this point. There, the court allowed the assertion of jurisdiction 
over a non-resident corporation when its employees were served98 with process while 
doing business in South Carolina, even though the corporation had never consented 
to service on its agents in South Carolina and the cause of action was unrelated to 
any business the corporation had conducted in South Carolina.99 The defendant relied 
upon a line of cases which held that a corporation that was only constructively 
present in a jurisdiction (i.e., subject to service via a statutory requirement)100 was 
only amenable to suit for causes of action that were related to the corporation’s 
activities within the state.101 The court rejected that argument, and in doing so 
illustrated the key difference between the constructive presence doctrine and actual 
presence: 
 
 95. Id. at 356. 
 96. Id. at 358–59 (emphasis added); see also Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d 
Cir. 1930) (“The shareholders, officers and agents are not individually the corporation, and do not carry 
it with them in all their legal transactions. It is only when engaged upon its affairs that they can be said to 
represent it, and we can see no qualitative distinction between one part of its doings and another, so they 
carry out the common plan. If we are to attribute locality to it at all, it must be equally present wherever 
any part of its work goes on, as much in the little as in the great.”). 
 97. 116 S.E. 101, 103 (S.C. 1923).  
 98. Id. (absenting the court noting the capacity in which the served employees were employed). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 102–03 (requiring that a corporation either be amenable to service via a statutorily appointed 
agent or a state official). 
 101. Id. 
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But we are concerned here, not with the constructive presence of 
the defendant corporation, but with its actual presence in the state; 
not with the effect of service of process upon constructive agents, 
but upon actual agents within the jurisdiction of the court issuing 
the process. . . . In that state of the facts it is wholly immaterial 
whether the defendant had complied with statutory requirements 
as to designating an agent upon whom process could be 
served[.]102 
Thus, Lipe makes clear that when a corporation sends its agents into a forum to do 
business, the corporation is actually present in that forum, not just constructively 
present based on theories of consent or compliance with statutory requirements.103 
Other courts reached similar conclusions in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, equating sending an agent to do business in a forum with the 
corporation’s actual presence in that forum. For example, in Mohr & Mohr Distilling 
Co. v. Insurance Cos.,104 the Southern District of Ohio upheld the exercise of 
jurisdiction over a non-resident insurance company whose agents were served while 
physically present and doing business in Ohio, reasoning that such activity 
“constituted [the insurance company] personally within the district, in such a sense 
as that [it] may be said to be found by process when issued against [it] and served on 
these agents.”105 Similarly, in Memphis & Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Pikey, the Indiana 
Supreme Court allowed the assertion of jurisdiction over a non-Indiana riverboat 
transportation company based on service in Indiana upon two wharf masters of the 
company.106 The court noted that the wharf masters were “agents of [the] 
defendant . . . who received and discharged freight for defendant, and who made 
contracts [in the cities where they were served] for and on account of defendant. . . . 
“107 
Just like in St. Clair, in each of these cases the key to the jurisdictional 
inquiry was not that the defendant was “doing business” in the forum at issue in some 
generalized sense, but rather the inquiry turned on whether the defendant’s agent was 
doing the corporation’s business when he was served with process in the forum, such 
 
 102. Id. at 103. 
 103. Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 107–108, 112–13 (1898) (affirming the exercise of 
jurisdiction by a federal court in New York over a corporation based in Great Britain based on service of 
the corporation’s agent in New York even though New York had no statute requiring that foreign 
corporations operating in New York be amenable to such service, making even clearer the validity of 
acquiring jurisdiction by service upon an agent of a foreign corporation independent of a statute 
establishing some kind of required consent); see also Brown v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 18 F.2d 677, 678 
(W.D. La. 1927) (“Even in the absence of a specific statute of the particular state or jurisdiction where the 
suit is brought, if the foreign corporation is doing business in that particular place, it can be brought into 
court through service upon its president, although the cause of action arises in another state.”); Moch v. 
Va. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 10 F. 696, 700 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1882) (“That a corporation doing business in a 
state other than that from which its charter is derived . . . through the agency of natural persons- may be 
sued and brought into court in that state by the service of process on its agent there, independently of any 
statute law or warrant of attorney expressly authorizing such service, has been very authoritatively 
decided.”). 
 104. 12 F. 474 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1882). 
 105. Id. at 475–76 (emphasis added). 
 106. 40 N.E. 527, 530 (Ind. 1895). 
 107. Id. 
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that the agent’s presence could render the defendant itself present in the forum.108 
Thus, when a corporation sends such agents into a forum to do business, “it stands 
on the same footing with a natural person” with respect to jurisdiction and service.109 
An important corollary principal is that the person acting as the “agent” of 
the corporation in the state must be more than an “agent” in the broad legal sense of 
the term. Instead, the person must have some authority over the business operations 
of the corporation, either because they are an officer, or because they are delegated 
that authority as a “managing agent.” 110 This limitation is necessary because an agent 
who is delegated a discrete task cannot be said to represent the corporation in such a 
way that establishes the corporation’s actual presence in a forum.111 
 
 108. Cf. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265–66, 268 (1917) (refusing to 
uphold the exercise of jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation where the corporation’s president was 
served while in the forum “engaged exclusively on personal matters unconnected with the company’s 
affairs” and the company did no other business in the forum). The fact that courts of this era were applying 
tag jurisdiction to corporations is even more evident in cases that applied a version of tag jurisdiction to 
intra-state disputes where corporate officers were served within a county different from the one where the 
corporation was based. See Badger Oil Co. v. Clay, 200 P. 433, 435 (Okla. 1921) (“The president of this 
company was served with summons in Grady county. He was there voluntarily, not induced to come to 
Grady county by any artifice, trick, or fraud, nor was he there in attendance on court or in obeyance to 
any subpœna. Under the statute, the service upon the president was service upon the corporation, and, 
being regularly served with summons, the court had jurisdiction.”). 
 109. Merchants’ Mfg. Co. v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 13 F. 358, 359 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882); see also N. 
Missouri R.R. Co. v. Akers, 4 Kan. 453, 469–70 (1868) (“A natural person, who goes into another State, 
carries along with him all his personal liabilities, and if a corporation chooses to exercise its power in 
another state, it ought of necessity to become amenable to its laws.  . . .”); Moulin v. Trenton Mut. Life & 
Fire Ins. Co., 25 N.J.L. 57, 65–66 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1855) (Elmer, J.) (rejecting a collateral attack on the 
judgment of a New York court entered against a New Jersey corporation which had previously conducted 
business in New York but had ceased doing so whose president was served while in New York for reasons 
unrelated to the corporation); Id. (One Justice’s opinion argued that the president “having been once 
avowedly sent into the state upon [the corporation’s] business, it requires no straining to hold, that if 
afterwards in the state at all, he ought to be considered as still clothed with his official character, so far as 
the business formerly transacted therein is concerned.”); Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co., 87 N.Y. 
137, 139–40 (1881) (affirming the exercise of jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation based on 
service upon its president while in the forum “for purposes of his own, on his way to a seaside resort, and 
not in his official capacity or upon any business of the defendant” because once the president was served 
“it became his duty, as its officer, to take notice of the commencement of the suit, or to convey such notice 
in some proper way to the defendant; and that he would do so could reasonably be presumed and 
expected”). 
 110. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Atchison, 34 F. 286, 289–90 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1888) (refusing to exercise 
jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation when the employee served “was not an officer and managing 
agent, or even a ticket agent of the company[,] had no independent office or place of business, . . . [and] 
[h]is authority was limited to soliciting business . . . “); see also Honerine Mining & Milling Co. v. 
Tallerday Steel Pipe & Tank Co., 88 P. 9, 11 (Utah 1906) (holding that an agent served with process “must 
at least belong to that class of agents who have been appointed by the corporation to represent it in its 
business affairs, or who are by it recognized as its agents, and intrusted [sic] with some of its property 
which in some way has connection with its general business affairs” in order for service to be sufficient 
to confer jurisdiction). 
 111. This illustrates yet another difference between the physical presence analysis these courts were 
engaging in and the constructive presence analysis that became modern minimum contacts jurisprudence. 
The actions of a corporation’s agents without substantial authority could certainly contribute to a finding 
that a corporation is constructively present in a jurisdiction via minimum contacts. See, e.g., Mesalic v. 
Fiberfloat Corp., 897 F.2d 696, 701 (3d Cir. 1990) (“The contacts at issue here . . . [including] substantial 
repairs by [the defendant’s employees] in New Jersey on two occasions . . . properly come under what the 
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3. Cases Conflating Constructive & Actual Presence 
To be sure, not every case from this era points in the same direction. Some 
contemporary courts conflated the concept of constructive presence and actual 
presence by requiring both that an agent be present in the state and that the defendant 
conduct some quantum of business above and beyond the business being conducted 
by that agent.112 After the turn of the century, this confusion led to some courts 
explicitly rejecting the assertion of tag jurisdiction over corporations; instead, 
replacing it entirely with the doctrine of constructive presence based on business 
related contacts.113 
The most prominent rejections of tag jurisdiction over corporations during 
this period were the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rosenberg Brothers & Company 
v. Curtis Brown Company114 and Consolidated Textile Corporation v. Gregory.115 In 
Rosenberg, the Court rejected New York’s assertion of jurisdiction over an 
Oklahoma company when the company’s president was served while purchasing 
supplies on the company’s behalf in New York.116 In Consolidated Textile, the Court 
rejected Wisconsin’s assertion of jurisdiction over an out of state company where the 
president was served while in Wisconsin for the purpose of negotiating on the 
company’s behalf in settlement talks related to the dispute that gave rise to the 
lawsuit before the Court.117 In both cases, the Court found that even though the 
officers were served in the forum, the corporate defendants were not “doing 
business” there and therefore could not be subject to the state’s jurisdiction.118 
Both cases were decided with almost no supporting analysis, and neither 
provides much modern support for exempting corporations from tag jurisdiction. 
Consolidated Textile has mostly been cited in subsequent years for its unrelated 
holding that a subsidiary’s contacts with a forum ordinarily cannot be imputed to the 
 
Supreme Court describes as contacts ‘that create a substantial connection with the forum state.’ The 
connection was one in which [the defendant], through its mechanics, availed itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities in New Jersey.”) (citation omitted). 
 112. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 29 F. 17, 35 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1886) (“[T]hree 
conditions must concur or co-exist in order to give the federal courts jurisdiction in personam over a 
corporation created without the territorial limits of the state in which the court is held, viz.: (1) It must 
appear as a matter of fact that the corporation is carrying on its business in such foreign state or district; 
(2) that such business is transacted or managed by some agent or officer appointed by and representing 
the corporation in such state; and (3) the existence of some local law making such corporation, or foreign 
corporations generally, amendable to suit there as a condition, express or implied, of doing business in 
the state.”). 
 113. See, e.g., Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 917–18 (1917) (“Unless a foreign 
corporation is engaged in business within the state, it is not brought within the state by the presence of its 
agents.”); Nelson v. W. Coast Grocery Co., 5 Alaska 59, 61–62 (D. Alaska 1914) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted) (“It is said . . . that by a long and unbroken line of decisions in the federal courts it has 
been held that, when a foreign corporation ‘does no business within the state, service upon an officer or 
agent of such corporation, temporarily within the jurisdiction upon private business of his own and on 
that of the corporation, will not bind the corporation.”). 
 114. 260 U.S. 516 (1923). 
 115. 289 U.S. 85 (1933). 
 116. 260 U.S. at 517–18. 
 117. 289 U.S. at 87–88. 
 118. Id. at 88; Rosenberg, 260 U.S. at 518. 
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parent corporation.119 Similarly, Rosenberg has only been relied on for the idea that 
a few isolated transactions are not sufficient to confer jurisdiction under the 
minimum contacts analysis, not its apparent rejection of tag jurisdiction.120 Tellingly, 
no court rejecting the assertion of tag jurisdiction over corporations after Burnham 
has cited either Consolidated Textile or Rosenberg to support its argument. 
In any event, Consolidated Textile and Rosenberg were decided long after 
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and therefore, under Justice Scalia’s 
methodology in Burnham, are not as persuasive on the question of whether the 
assertion of tag jurisdiction over corporations is consistent with due process as earlier 
cases.121 Instead of reflecting any historical practice, these cases likely represent the 
confusion associated with the rise of the use of business contacts as a form of 
corporate constructive presence at the same time courts were beginning to recognize 
that corporations could actually move and act outside the borders of their home 
states. Indeed, in another case earlier in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court 
seemed to imply a separation between acquiring jurisdiction by serving an officer 
present in a forum on corporate business and acquiring jurisdiction by measuring the 
quantum of business the corporation was doing in the forum: 
[T]he mere fact that an officer of a corporation may temporarily 
be in the state or even permanently reside therein, if not there for 
the purpose of transacting business for the corporation, or vested 
with authority by the corporation to transact business in such state, 
affords no basis for acquiring jurisdiction[.]122 
Thus, even at that late date the Court still drew a distinction between situations where 
an officer was served outside of the corporation’s home state while there for reasons 
unrelated to corporate business and situations where the officer enters a forum to act 
on the corporation’s behalf.123 It was not until later in cases like Consolidated Textile 
and Rosenberg that the Court began to reject tag jurisdiction over corporations by 
erroneously absorbing it into what would become minimum contacts analysis. 
 
 119. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 705 n.* (1988); Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 n.13 (1984). 
 120. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. at 417–18; Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). See Dynamo v. Warehouse of Vending & Games, 168 F. Supp. 
2d 616, 620 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418 n.12) (calling into question even 
this aspect of Rosenberg’s holding when it comes to specific jurisdiction). Although the Supreme Court 
has suggested that the continuing validity of Rosenberg with respect to an assertion of specific jurisdiction 
might be questioned, it has not yet addressed that issue. 
 121. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 611. Disregarding early twentieth century Supreme Court cases in 
favor of nineteenth century judicial trends is a familiar outcome of an originalist approach to constitutional 
analysis. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 983–85, 990–94 (1991) (Scalia, J., plurality) (rejecting 
a 1910 Supreme Court case approving Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis in part by relying on 
nineteenth century cases rejecting such analysis). 
 122. Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 195. 
 123. See also Goldey v. Morning News of New Haven, 156 U.S. 518, 521–22 (1895) (“[A] judgment 
rendered in a court of one state, against a corporation neither incorporated nor doing business within the 
state, must be regarded as of no validity in the courts of another state, or of the United States, unless 
service of process was made in the first state upon an agent appointed to act there for the corporation, and 
not merely upon an officer or agent residing in another state, and only casually within the state, and not 
charged with any business of the corporation there.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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* * * * * 
Therefore, under Justice Scalia’s opinion in Burnham, because in-state 
service on an officer engaged in corporate business was an accepted way to obtain 
personal jurisdiction over corporations at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
ratification, tag jurisdiction should be valid today under the Due Process Clause.124 
B.  Fairness Justifications 
Under Justice Brennan’s Burnham opinion, every method of asserting 
personal jurisdiction “must comport with contemporary notions of due process.”125 
The factors Justice Brennan considered that drove him to conclude that tag 
jurisdiction was generally126 consistent with contemporary notions of due process, 
were (1) the reasonable expectations of defendants, (2) whether defendants avail 
themselves of the benefits of the fora, and (3) whether there is a great burden on 
defendants in having to litigate in the fora.127 All of these factors strongly support 
the assertion of tag jurisdiction over corporations, perhaps even more so than they 
do the assertion of such jurisdiction over individual defendants. 
1. Corporations Should Reasonably Expect To Be Subject To 
Jurisdiction In Fora Where Executives Travel To Conduct Corporate 
Business 
Justice Brennan concluded that individual defendants should reasonably 
expect to be subject to jurisdiction in any forum where they travel because 
“American courts have announced the rule for perhaps a century” which “provides a 
defendant voluntarily present in a particular State today clear notice that [he] is 
subject to suit in the forum.”128 Applying this justification to corporations is difficult 
because there is a question about the level of generality at which the “rule” is defined: 
if the rule is tag jurisdiction in general, then corporations would be subject to the 
same level of notice as everyone else, but if the rule is tag jurisdiction as applied to 
individuals, then corporations would need to be on some kind of separate notice that 
tag jurisdiction applies to entities. Assuming the latter method of defining the rule, 
 
 124. Another part of Justice Scalia’s opinion does suggest that even traditional practices may be 
subject to invalidity (or at least closer scrutiny) if the method of obtaining jurisdiction has been abandoned 
by most states. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 622. However, although the validity of asserting tag jurisdiction 
over corporations has not been analyzed by many contemporary state court decisions, many state statutes 
allow for in-state service on out-of-state corporations by virtue of serving a corporate officer who happens 
to be present in the state. See 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 807 n.2. See also 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CIVIL § 1068 n.12 (collecting citations to 
states with long-arm statutes extending to the limits of what is allowable under the federal Constitution). 
 125. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 632 (opinion of Brennan, J.). 
 126. The only situations in which Justice Brennan suggested such an exercise may not be valid are 
cases where the defendant was brought to the forum involuntarily. See id. at 637 n.11. Of course, this 
exception has long been a feature of tag jurisdiction. See id. at 613 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (noting that in 
the nineteenth century, “[m]ost States . . . had statutes or common-law rules that exempted from service 
of process individuals who were brought into the forum by force or fraud, or who were there as a party or 
witness in unrelated judicial proceedings.”) (citations omitted). 
 127. See id. at 635–39 (opinion of Brennan, J.). 
 128. Id. at 636–37 (quotations and citation omitted). 
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although there are some courts that have applied tag jurisdiction to corporations at 
some periods in American history, it would be difficult to argue that courts have 
applied it to corporations with the same consistency as they have to individuals. 
However, there are other reasons corporations should reasonably expect to be subject 
to jurisdiction in forums where their officers travel to conduct business. 
First, many state statutes require corporations to appoint an in-state agent 
to receive service of process as a condition of doing business in those fora.129 Courts 
have long approved these statutes on the theory that “[w]hen [a corporation] avails 
itself of the privileges of doing business in a state whose laws authorize it to be sued 
there by service of process upon an agent, its assent to that mode of service is 
implied.”130 This consent justification could just as easily serve as a notice 
justification in this context. If a corporation sends an officer to conduct business in 
a forum with a statute authorizing service on that officer, it would be reasonable for 
the corporation to be aware that it may be subject to jurisdiction in that forum. 
Second, corporations are more likely to be familiar with the laws of a state 
where it sends an officer to do business than an individual defendant simply traveling 
to a different state. Some corporations are highly sophisticated companies with 
legions of in house and external lawyers at their disposal for the express purpose of 
investigating every possible legal risk those companies face131 Obviously, for one of 
those companies it would be much easier to anticipate where it might be subject to 
jurisdiction when deciding where to send its officers to conduct business than it 
would be for an ordinary person making travel plans.132 
Of course, not all corporations are huge conglomerates. But, even the 
smallest of corporations has to demonstrate minimal familiarity with the legal system 
to bring itself into existence. Setting up a corporation requires registration with the 
state in the form of filing articles of incorporation that comply with statutory 
requirements and obtaining a certificate of incorporation.133 It can also require the 
filing of other documents “such as underwriting agreements, stock subscription 
agreements, registration statements required by federal and state securities laws, and 
reservation and registration of corporate name forms.”134 The same is true for other 
entities such as limited liability companies which have to file compliant articles of 
organization with state government officials.135 Thus, even the smallest of 
corporations, by their very existence, have demonstrated more familiarity with the 
 
 129. See 18 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 8728. 
 130. See, e.g., Merchants’ Mfg. Co. v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 11 Abb. N. Cas. 183, 13 F. 358, 359 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882). 
 131. Indeed, a disproportionate number of major corporate CEOs—and probably other officers—are 
lawyers themselves. See Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree 7 
n.8 (HLS Program on the Legal Profession Research Paper No. 2013-6), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2250585. 
 132. Cf. Christine P. Bartholomew, Redefining Prey and Predator in Class Actions, 80 BROOK. L. 
REV. 743, 770–73 (2015) (describing the inherent advantages corporations have over natural persons in 
litigation). 
 133. See, e.g., 1A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS §§ 129, 137–46, 166 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2010). 
 134. See, e.g., id. § 135. 
 135. See, e.g., id. § 137. 
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legal system than the average natural person and, therefore, are more likely to be on 
notice of the implications of sending an officer to another forum to conduct business. 
Thus, even aside from their awareness of the general validity of tag 
jurisdiction, the existence of state statutes authorizing service on foreign 
corporations through their officers, combined with corporations’ inherent increased 
awareness of legal risks, makes it reasonable for corporations to anticipate being 
subject to tag jurisdiction.136 
2. Corporations Avail Themselves Of Forum Benefits When They Send 
Officers Into Fora To Conduct Corporate Business 
The second factor on which Justice Brennan relied in approving tag 
jurisdiction was the benefits that even transient visitors obtain from visiting other 
states. He noted that a visitor to a state has his or her “health and safety . . . 
guaranteed by the State’s police, fire, and emergency medical services[,] . . . is free 
to travel on the State’s roads and waterways [and] likely enjoys the fruits of the 
State’s economy as well.”137 The opinion also relied on the protection the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Article IV offers to out of state residents from 
discrimination in access to other state’s courts.138 Justice Brennan argued that 
without tag jurisdiction “an asymmetry would arise: A transient would have the full 
benefit of the power of the forum State’s courts as a plaintiff while retaining 
immunity from their authority as a defendant.”139 
A corporation sending its officer into a state enjoys all of these benefits and 
much more. Not only does the corporation—through its traveling officer—enjoy the 
benefits of the emergency personnel and transportation routes Justice Brennan listed, 
the corporation almost certainly will in some capacity or another enjoy “the fruits of 
the state’s economy.” This is because tag jurisdiction can only be asserted over a 
corporation when the officer is traveling into the forum in order to do something on 
the corporation’s behalf.140 This is in contrast to an individual defendant who may 
enter a forum for any number of non-economic reasons.141 Thus, the corporation 
sending its officer into a forum will usually derive more benefits from the forum than 
a transient individual defendant. 
Although the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV does not apply 
to corporations, corporations nevertheless are protected from irrational 
discrimination when traveling to other states by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
 
 136. Of course, this factor is in some sense circular since if the Supreme Court or additional circuit 
courts and state supreme courts were to declare tag jurisdiction applicable to corporations that would 
obviously heighten corporations’ awareness of the likelihood of being subject to tag jurisdiction. Cf. 
Burnham v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 625 (1990) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (“Justice Brennan’s long 
journey is a circular one, leaving him, at the end of the day, in complete reliance upon the very factor he 
sought to avoid: The existence of a continuing tradition is not enough, fairness also must be considered; 
fairness exists here because there is a continuing tradition.”). 
 137. Id. at 637–38 (opinion of Brennan, J.). 
 138. Id. at 638. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See supra Part III.A. 
 141. See, e.g., Rutherford v. Rutherford, 971 P.2d 220, 220–21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (asserting tag 
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who entered the state to visit his children and friends). 
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Fourteenth Amendment.142 They also enjoy a further constitutional protection not 
enjoyed—or at least not enjoyed to the same degree—by individuals: the protection 
of the dormant Commerce Clause.143 The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine 
provides a strong bar against states treating businesses based outside of their borders 
differently from local businesses. This protection facilitates the operation of 
corporations across state lines — a protection that corporations take direct advantage 
of when they send an officer to another state to conduct business on their behalf. 
Finally, corporate immunity to tag jurisdiction also would create substantial 
“asymmetry,” but of a far more insidious kind than what Justice Brennan was 
concerned with in Burnham. Just like natural persons could in the absence of tag 
jurisdiction, corporations could freely enter other fora and utilize their courts while 
retaining immunity from the authority of those courts as defendants. But, exempting 
corporations from tag jurisdiction after Burnham also would create an even greater 
asymmetry — corporations would be able to travel freely in other jurisdictions 
without subjecting themselves to jurisdiction while natural persons would not. The 
inherent unfairness of this discrepancy is obvious. When a natural person can be 
subject to personal jurisdiction for such unplanned “visits” to a state such as being 
on a plane that stops in a state to refuel,144 being on a ship that docks in a state’s 
port,145 or even being on a flying plane that happens to be passing over the state,146 
it would be unfair if a corporation’s calculated decision to send an officer into a 
forum to conduct corporate business carried no jurisdictional consequences. 
3. The Burden On Corporations To Litigate In Fora Where Officers Are 
Tagged Is Minor 
The final factor that drove Justice Brennan to find tag jurisdiction consistent 
with contemporary notions of due process was that the burdens on the defendant to 
litigate in a forum in which he has already traveled “are slight.”147 In support of that 
conclusion, Justice Brennan pointed out that “[m]odern transportation and 
communications have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend 
 
 142. See W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of California, 451 U.S. 648, 656, 667–68 
(1981). Moreover, the rule barring corporations from protection under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause has been subject to consistent criticism since at least the early twentieth century. See Brian Kalb, 
Comment, Unincorporated Businesses Under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
585, 585 n.3 (2001) (collecting sources). 
 143. Under the dormant commerce clause doctrine: 
[t]he Commerce Clause operates as an implicit restraint on state authority, even 
in the absence of conflicting federal statute. In a dormant Commerce Clause 
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Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3—Supreme Court Cases, 41 A.L.R. Fed. 2d Art. 1, § 2 (2009). 
 144. See In re Gonzalez, 993 S.W.2d 147, 151–52 (Tex. App. 1999). 
 145. See Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217, 222 (1870). 
 146. See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 443, 448 (E.D. Ark. 1959). 
 147. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 638 (1990). 
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himself in a State outside his place of residence,” that the defendant’s presence in 
the forum for service was “an indication that suit in the forum likely would not be 
prohibitively inconvenient[,]” and that “any burdens that do arise can be ameliorated 
by a variety of procedural devices” such as motions to dismiss and inexpensive forms 
of discovery that can be conducted over great distances.148 
All of these reasons offered by Justice Brennan apply (at least) equally to 
corporations. Modern methods of transportation and communication have obviously 
become even more helpful in litigating cases across state lines than they were in 1990 
when Burnham was decided. A corporation’s decision to send an officer into a forum 
to conduct business also indicates—probably more than a natural person’s fortuitous 
presence might—that the corporation has the ability to defend itself in that forum 
without undue inconvenience. Finally, the same procedural devices that help natural 
persons litigate at great distances are equally available to corporations.149 
At least two other factors also lessen the burden on corporations to litigate 
in fora where their officers are tagged. First, corporations usually cannot appear pro 
se,150 and therefore will need to hire an attorney to represent them in court no matter 
where a case is litigated. Thus, unlike a natural person, a corporation’s officers do 
not need to travel for the purpose of appearing to defend the corporation in court in 
a distant forum. Second, the traditional safeguards against tag jurisdiction being 
unfairly applied to individuals would also apply to corporations acting through their 
officers: a corporation would not be subject to tag jurisdiction under circumstances 
where the corporate officer’s presence in the forum was not voluntary or was 
compelled by judicial process.151 
To be sure, there will certainly be some burdens associated with a 
corporation having to litigate in a forum that is not its home and with which it might 
not have any significant contacts other than the officer’s trip that triggered the 
exercise of jurisdiction. However, as one court put it in 1882, “every natural person 
who journeys through these states is liable to a similar hardship, and I am not 
persuaded that the hardship is likely to be so great that such a condition is to be 
pronounced unreasonable, or that any rule of public policy forbids it.”152 
* * * * * * 
It may be questionable whether the idea of tag jurisdiction is actually 
consistent with contemporary notions of fairness as Justice Brennan argued.153 
 
 148. Id. at 638–39, 639 n.13 (citations and quotations omitted). 
 149. See, e.g., Bartholomew, supra note 132, at 745–46 (noting the advantage to corporate defendants 
provided by procedural barriers to actions such as dispositive motions). 
 150. See, e.g., 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 796 (2007). 
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However, in a post-Burnham world where tag jurisdiction is applicable to natural 
persons, it is certainly consistent with fundamental fairness to apply tag jurisdiction 
to corporations as well. 
III. LOWER COURTS’ RELUCTANCE TO TAG CORPORATIONS 
Despite the reasoning of both Burnham opinions pointing in the direction 
of imposing tag jurisdiction on corporations, lower courts have been largely reluctant 
to do so.154 Instead, lower courts have offered a variety of justifications for departing 
from Burnham when it comes to non-individuals. Some courts have contorted 
Burnham to argue that it somehow exempted corporations from its analysis. Other 
courts have pointed to the Supreme Court’s 1952 decision Perkins v. Benguet 
Consolidated Mining Co.155 as purportedly establishing that corporations are only 
subject to minimum contacts analysis. At least one court has argued that pre-
International Shoe case law excludes corporations from tag jurisdiction. Finally, 
some courts have attempted to essentially limit Burnham to its facts or argue that tag 
jurisdiction should not be applied to corporations because doing so would be bad 
policy. 
As the next subsection explains, each of these justifications is ultimately 
unpersuasive. Moreover, as described in the following subsection, a minority of 
courts have actually embraced the application of tag jurisdiction to business entities, 
albeit without providing a theoretical foundation for doing so. 
A.  Courts Rejecting Tag Jurisdiction Over Corporations 
1. Courts Finding Burnham Counsels Against Applying Tag 
Jurisdiction to Corporations 
The primary justification courts have offered for departing from tag 
jurisdiction in the business entity context is that Burnham itself somehow suggested 
that its holding did not apply to business entities. In Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, for 
example, the Ninth Circuit held tag jurisdiction was inapplicable to corporate 
defendants.156 That case, which originated in the Northern District of California, 
involved four individual plaintiffs asserting product liability claims against various 
defendants arising from a plane crash that occurred in Cuba.157 One of the 
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 155. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
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 157. Id. at 1064–65. 
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defendants, a French aviation company called Avions de Transport Régional 
(“ATR”), had limited contacts with the state of California (and no contacts related to 
the crash).158 The plaintiffs served a copy of the summons and complaint on ATR’s 
Vice President of Marketing while he was in California attending a conference on 
ATR’s behalf.159 
The Ninth Circuit held that service of process on ATR’s Vice President 
while he was in California on company business was insufficient to give rise to 
personal jurisdiction over ATR in California.160 The court reasoned that “[a]n officer 
of a corporation is not the corporation, even when the officer acts on the 
corporation’s behalf. While a corporation may in some abstract sense be ‘present’ 
wherever its officers do business, such presence is not physical in the way 
contemplated by Burnham.”161 The court also argued that the Supreme Court never 
suggested tag jurisdiction applied to corporations in Burnham, and, like other courts 
that have reached this conclusion, supported that proposition by citing Justice 
Scalia’s footnoted observation that “corporations have never fitted comfortably in a 
jurisdictional regime based primarily upon ‘de facto power over the defendant’s 
person.’”162 
Neither of these arguments is convincing. The first argument echoes early 
twentieth century courts in conflating the distinction between constructive corporate 
presence (what Martinez calls “abstract” presence) and actual corporate presence.163 
Constructive presence does not turn on actual physical presence whether applied to 
corporations or natural persons; instead, it depends on the overall level of contact the 
defendant has with the forum (i.e., minimum contacts).164 It is quite unremarkable 
that ATR sending its executive into California on one occasion was insufficient to 
establish constructive presence. However, the officer’s presence in California should 
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895 A.2d 1006 (2006) (arguing that Burnham cannot support jurisdiction here “because no one has ever 
acted on [the defendant’s] behalf in Maryland sufficient to justify the fiction that [the defendant] has been 
present in the jurisdiction.”). 
 162. Martinez, 764 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610 n.1). See, e.g., N. Ins. Co. of New 
York v. Constr. Navale Bordeaux, No. 11-60462-CV, 2011 WL 2682950, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 11, 2011) 
(“[T]he main plurality opinion’s only reference to foreign corporations appears to state that the Court 
expresses no views ‘with respect to these matters,’—presumably whether service upon a corporate officer 
is sufficient for jurisdiction without a contacts-based analysis.”); Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. dos Reis Jr. 
Ind. Com. de Equip. Medico, No. 07-CV-309 LAJB, 2008 WL 789925, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2008) 
(citing Justice Scalia’s footnote to argue that “in Burnham [tag jurisdiction] was applied only to an 
individual in his individual capacity. It has not been applied to corporations.”), rev’d on other grounds 
sub nom. Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com de Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 163. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 164. See, e.g., McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221–24 (1957) (subjecting defendant 
insurance company to personal jurisdiction in California where it had no employees in California). 
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have instead established the physical presence of ATR, and thus its amenability to 
tag jurisdiction.165 
As for Justice Scalia’s footnote, at least a few courts have recognized that—
when read in context—it merely stands for the proposition that general jurisdiction 
under International Shoe may only apply to corporations, and not to individuals.166 
In other words, the footnote suggested a limit to the assertion of personal jurisdiction 
over individuals because of the differences between individuals and corporations, 
not a limit to the assertion of jurisdiction over corporations. 
2. Courts Arguing Perkins Precludes Exercising Tag Jurisdiction Over 
Entities. 
Many courts, including the Ninth Circuit in Martinez, and the Fifth Circuit 
in Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corporation,167 have also argued that the 
 
 165. At least one court has argued that the presence of one partner acting on the partnership’s behalf 
does not make a partnership “present” for jurisdictional purposes under the theory that a partnership has 
an existence independent from the partners themselves (known as the entity theory). See Mission West, 
873 A.2d at 384; 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 100 (2014). However, this does not change the calculus, it merely 
puts partnerships on the same footing as corporations—as independent entities that still act through their 
partners and directors respectively. See 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 140 (2014); see also Donatelli v. Nat’l 
Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 466 (1st Cir. 1990) (“The general rule is that jurisdiction over a partner 
confers jurisdiction over the partnership. Primarily, this comes about because a partner is deemed by law 
and contract to be the partnership’s general agent.”); Bowles v. Marx Hide & Tallow Co., 4 F.R.D. 297, 
299 (W.D. Ky. 1945) (“Process against the partnership under its partnership name, and service on one of 
the partners brings the partnership and the partnership assets before the Court.”) (collecting cases). In fact, 
thinking of partnerships as entities independent from their partners may strengthen the case for the 
assertion of tag jurisdiction over them because it brings them closer to the status of natural persons. See 
infra, Part V. 
 166. See Friedfertig Family P’ship 2 v. Lofberg, CIV.A. No. 13-1546 JLL, 2013 WL 6623907, at *7 
(D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2013) (“The United States Supreme Court has indicated that the ‘continuous and 
systematic contacts’ standard has been applied to cases involving corporate defendants, but is not extended 
to individual defendants.”) (citation omitted) report and recommendation rejected on other grounds, 
CIV.A. No. 13-1546 JLL, 2013 WL 6623896 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2013); Sportrust Associates Int’l, Inc. v. 
Sports Corp., 304 F. Supp. 2d 789, 792 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“Although it declined to decide the issue, the 
Supreme Court has questioned whether this type of general jurisdiction can ever apply to individuals, 
rather than corporations.”) (citing Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610 n.1). 
 167. 966 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1992). Wenche Siemer differed from Martinez in at least one important 
respect. In Wenche Siemer, the plaintiffs did not serve an officer of the corporate defendant but instead 
merely served an agent designated for service of process by the company as a condition of doing business 
in Texas. Id. at 181–83. Many—but not all—courts facing situations where a corporate agent registered 
pursuant to state law to receive service of process was served have agreed that such service is not alone 
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., WorldCare Corp. v. World Ins. Co., 767 F. Supp. 2d 
341, 352–54 & n.21 (D. Conn. 2011) (following Wenche Siemer on this point and collecting other cases 
doing the same); Conner v. ContiCarriers & Terminals, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 405, 412–17 (Tex. App. 1997) 
(same) but see Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 1990) (“A defendant 
may voluntarily consent or submit to the jurisdiction of a court which otherwise would not have 
jurisdiction over it. One of the most solidly established ways of giving such consent is to designate an 
agent for service of process within the State.”) (citation omitted). Even if service on a corporate agent 
required to be designated by statute is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction, the same reasoning does 
not necessarily apply to a corporate officer acting on the corporation’s behalf in the forum. See infra, Part 
IV.3; cf. Allied Carriers Exch., Inc. v. Alliance Shippers, Inc., No. CV 98-WM-2744, 1999 WL 35363796, 
at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 22, 1999) (“As Justice Brennan explained: ‘By visiting the forum State, a transient 
defendant actually ‘avail[s]’ himself, of significant benefits provided by the State.’ Where, as here, a 
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Supreme Court’s decision in Perkins,168 precludes the application of tag jurisdiction 
to non-individuals. In Perkins, the Court conducted an analysis of the corporate 
defendant’s forum related contacts even though the plaintiffs had personally served 
the defendant’s president in the forum at issue.169 Wenche Siemer and Martinez argue 
this analysis in Perkins suggests that personal service on the defendant’s officer 
alone was insufficient to give rise to jurisdiction.170 However, as at least one court 
has pointed out, the fact that the defendant’s president in Perkins was served in the 
forum and the defendant had significant contacts with the forum cuts both ways: 
because the Supreme Court “found that the foreign corporation was engaged in 
‘continuous and systematic’ business in Ohio, . . . the Court was not presented with 
the issue of whether due process allowed transient jurisdiction over a corporation 
where such extensive contacts were lacking.”171 
In Mission West Properties, L.P. v. Republic Properties Corporation 
(Mission West),172 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held a partnership could 
not be subject to jurisdiction in Maryland based on in-state service of one of the 
partners.173 The court relied in part on dicta from Perkins stating that: 
[I]f an authorized representative of a foreign corporation [is] 
physically present in the state of the forum and . . . engaged in 
activities appropriate to accepting service or receiving notice on 
its behalf, . . . there is no unfairness in subjecting that corporation 
to the jurisdiction of the courts of that state through such service 
of process upon that representative. This has been squarely held to 
be so in a proceeding in personam against such a corporation, at 
least in relation to a cause of action arising out of the 
corporation’s activities within the state of the forum.174 
The citation of this passage is puzzling since, if anything, the first sentence seems to 
support the assertion of tag jurisdiction over corporations because it endorses the 
idea that if an officer is physically present in the forum engaged in corporate 
activities, the corporation may be subject to service through the officer. The second 
sentence simply points to one example of a situation where this has been “squarely 
 
corporation merely applies to do business in the forum state, but actually conducts no business there, it 
has not actually availed itself of the benefits provided by the forum state.”) (citations omitted). 
 168. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 169. Id. at 438, 442–49. 
 170. See, e.g., Wenche Siemer, 966 F.2d at 183 (“In Perkins, the Supreme Court upheld general 
jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation that had been served in Ohio by serving its president while he 
was conducting the corporation’s business in the state, but only after a thorough ‘minimum contacts’ and 
fairness analysis.”); Martinez, 764 F.3d at 1068–69 (“If tag jurisdiction had been available, that alone 
would have resolved the case. But the Court upheld jurisdiction only after deciding whether “the business 
done in Ohio . . . was sufficiently substantial” to allow jurisdiction over claims unrelated to the company’s 
Ohio contacts.”); See also Navale Bordeaux, No. 11-60462-CV, 2011 WL 2682950, at *2 (“Perkins . . . 
did not hold that service in a state upon an officer of a corporation obviates the need to do a minimum 
contacts analysis.”). 
 171. Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark Int’l Ltd., 956 F. Supp. 1131, 1137 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 172. 873 A.2d 372 (2005) 
 173. Id. at 37–38. 
 174. Id. at 31 (quoting Perkins, 342 U.S. at 444–47) (emphasis in original). 
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held” to be so—in a situation where forum-based activities relate to the cause of 
action. The second sentence does not offer any limitation on where the principal in 
the first sentence could apply (hence the use of “at least”). 
3. Mission West: Reliance on Pre-International Shoe Cases 
The Mission West court was unique in that it buttressed its argument with 
what purported to be a more thorough analysis of the historical record than the other 
courts reaching the same conclusion. The court based its conclusion, in part, on a 
few pre-International Shoe Supreme Court cases: James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage 
Co. v. Harry,175 Kendall v. American Automatic Loom Co.,176 and St. Clair v. Cox.177 
In James-Dickinson, the Court rejected Illinois’ exercise of jurisdiction over a non-
resident corporation where its president was served in Illinois while there “on 
business of the corporation.”178 In Kendall, the Court rejected New York’s assertion 
of jurisdiction over a West Virginia corporation through service on the corporation’s 
treasurer in New York.179 In St. Clair, the Court favorably described a Michigan case 
rejecting the assertion of jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant corporation 
based on service of its officer who was only “casually” present in the state.180 
However, other than quoting superficially supportive passages, the Mission 
West court did not provide a detailed explanation of why these cases supported its 
conclusion, and in fact, all of them are of little weight or distinguishable upon closer 
examination. As the Mission West court admitted, the holding in James-Dickinson 
was terse and supported by virtually no reasoning.181 Moreover, James-Dickenson’s 
holding appears to be premised on the idea that a corporation cannot ever be subject 
to jurisdiction in a place where it has no “place of business,” a proposition that is 
obviously inconsistent with modern personal jurisdiction doctrine and modern 
conceptions of the corporate personality.182 Finally, James-Dickenson was not 
decided until 1927, many decades after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and during a period where—as discussed in Part III.A.3, supra, courts erroneously 
conflated the distinction between physical corporate presence and constructive 
corporate presence. 
Both Kendall and the Michigan case discussed in St. Clair183 involved 
situations where the officers were served during a time when they were not acting 
 
 175. 273 U.S. 119 (1927). 
 176. 198 U.S. 477 (1905). 
 177. 106 U.S. 350 (1882). St. Clair is discussed in more detail in Part III.A.2. 
 178. 273 U.S. at 122. 
 179. 198 U.S. at 482–83. 
 180. 106 U.S. at 357–58 (citing Newell v. Great W. Ry. Co., of Canada, 19 Mich. 336 (1869)). 
 181. See 873 A.2d 372, 381 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (characterizing the holding in Jackson-
Dickenson as being declared “without much discussion”). 
 182. See, e.g., McGee, 355 U.S. at 222–24 (subjecting defendant insurance company to personal 
jurisdiction in California where it had no offices in California). See also infra Part V (discussing the 
evolution of the corporate person from a creature of the state to an independent entity). 
 183. As discussed in supra Part III.A.2, St. Clair’s discussion of the history of the assertion of 
jurisdiction over corporations actually supports the exercise of tag jurisdiction over corporations. 
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on the corporation’s behalf while present in the forum.184 The question posed by an 
officer who is acting on behalf of the company at the time of in-forum service is a 
very different one. Tag jurisdiction has always required voluntary presence in the 
forum.185 When an officer travels for reasons totally unrelated to the company, his 
or her choice to enter a forum cannot be imputed to the corporation, and the 
corporation cannot be said to have traveled to that forum voluntarily.186 In contrast, 
when an officer is directed by the corporation to enter another forum to act on the 
corporation’s behalf, the corporation is making a voluntary choice to enter the forum 
that is analogous to the choice made by traveling natural persons.187 
4. Courts Giving Other Reasons For Declining To Apply Tag 
Jurisdiction to Corporations 
Other courts have not found any aspect of Burnham or earlier cases 
controlling, but have nevertheless independently concluded that tag jurisdiction 
should not be applied to corporations. For example, in C.S.B. Commodities, Inc. v. 
Urban Trend (HK) Ltd.,188 the president of the defendant, a corporation based in 
Hong Kong, was served while attending a trade show in Chicago on behalf of the 
company.189 The C.S.B. court acknowledged that Burnham “left unresolved” the 
question of whether tag jurisdiction applied to corporations and—to its credit—
recognized that Justice Scalia’s footnote was not controlling since it was “made in 
 
 184. In the Michigan case discussed in St. Clair, the court explicitly recognized that the officer was 
only “casually” in Michigan and not there on any business of the corporation. 106 U.S. at 357–58 (citing 
Newell v. Great W. Ry. Co., of Canada, 19 Mich. 336 (1869)). In Kendall, 198 U.S. at 479, it is less clear 
from the facts what the officer was doing in New York when he was served with process, but it appears 
that at the time he was served the corporate defendant had effectively been defunct for several years 
making it unlikely he was in New York on corporate business. See id. (“[S]ince August 10, 1901, there 
had been no meeting, either of the stockholders or of the directors; and on the last-mentioned date the 
stockholders were notified that the company had no funds with which to pay the franchise taxes which 
were due to the state of West Virginia.  . . . The sole assets of the company consisted of two automatic 
looms and tools and machinery employed in the making thereof and its patents.  . . . The company had no 
bank account, no office force, and no employees. It had never reached the stage of the active transaction 
of business[.]”). 
 185. See supra Part III.A.3 and note 151. 
 186. When an officer of an entity is served while in a forum for reasons unrelated to his or her status 
as an officer, courts unsurprisingly nearly always reject the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the 
entity. See, e.g., Peguero y otros v. Hernandez Pellot, P.R. Offic. Trans. 14 & n.13 (Nov. 14, 1995) 
(rejecting the assertion of jurisdiction over a corporation based on service of process on an officer present 
in the forum for non-business reasons but explicitly declining to decide whether the court would reach the 
same conclusion of the trip were on corporate business); see also Rocky Mountain Chipseal, LLC v. 
Sherman Cnty., Kan., 841 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1229 (D. Colo. 2012) (“When a corporate officer is served 
in the forum state while she was there for reasons unrelated to the defendant-corporation, and that 
corporation lacks minimum contacts with the forum state, serving that officer did not confer the forum 
state with jurisdiction over the corporation.”); O’Brien v. Eubanks, 701 P.2d 614, 617 (Colo. App. 1984) 
(“Because there were no other contacts between Kemco and Colorado, the transitory and non-business 
related presence of its president could not support finding the corporation’s presence within the state to 
be sufficient to confer jurisdiction.”). 
 187. See infra Part V (discussing an officer’s ability to act on the corporation’s behalf in other areas 
of constitutional law). 
 188. 626 F. Supp. 2d 837 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 189. Id. at 842, 849. 
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response to a different question—whether individual defendants can ever be subject 
to general jurisdiction based on their ‘continuous and systematic’ contacts in a state 
and in any event Justice Scalia made clear that the Court was expressing no views 
on the matter.”190 Analyzing the issue for itself, the court found that 
Permitting service on any employee or agent of a corporation to 
create general jurisdiction on the theory that a corporation is 
therefore “present” would create the same issues minimum 
contacts hoped to resolve. A traditional minimum contacts 
analysis removes the necessity of drawing bright but arbitrary lines 
of where a non-physical entity is present and ensures that due 
process is satisfied.191 
The court did not explain why this same reasoning would not apply with 
equal or even greater force to individual persons. Moreover, the court seemed to 
assume that the “arbitrary” line drawing associated with presence based jurisdiction 
would somehow replace minimum contacts with respect to corporations if such 
jurisdiction were permitted. However, as Burnham made clear with respect to 
individual defendants, it would do no such thing, but rather would only supplement 
the existing contacts-based regime. 
Other courts have explicitly found Burnham not binding either because it 
produced no majority opinion192 or simply because it did not involve a corporation.193 
For example, in MBM Fisheries, Inc. v. Bollinger Mach. Shop & Shipyard, Inc.,194 
the Washington Court of Appeals rejected the exercise of jurisdiction over a non-
resident corporate defendant whose vice-president was served with process while 
present in Washington representing the corporation at a trade show.195 The court 
reasoned that Burnham was “limited to its facts” because no opinion garnered 
majority support, but that “[i]n any event, the nonresident defendant in Burnham was 
a natural person.”196 Thus, the court concluded—without explaining why this 
distinction was significant—”service of process on an agent of a nonresident 
 
 190. Id. at 849. 
 191. Id. at 850. 
 192. See MBM Fisheries, Inc. v. Bollinger Mach. Shop & Shipyard, Inc., 804 P.2d 627, 631 n.3. 
(Wash. Ct. App 1991) (finding Burnham “limited to its facts”); Conner v. ContiCarriers & Terminals, 
Inc., 944 S.W.2d 405, 413 (Tex. App. 1997) (“Burnham is a plurality opinion and does not provide the 
persuasive, binding authority the [plaintiffs] attribute to it.”). 
 193. MBM Fisheries, 804 P.2d at 631 n.3; Krishanti v. Rajaratnam, No. 2:09-CV-05395 (JLL)(JAD), 
2014 WL 1669873, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2014) (“Plaintiffs’ reliance on Burnham is misplaced, as the 
holding in Burnham only applies to individuals, not corporations.”); Overseas Partners, Inc. v. PROGEN 
Musavirlik ve Yonetim Hizmetleri, Ltd. Sikerti, 15 F. Supp. 2d 47, 50 n.4 (D.D.C. 1998) (“There is 
nothing in the Burnham opinion which indicates that the traditional minimum contacts test should be 
abandoned when an official of a corporation is served within the relevant jurisdiction”); James v. Illinois 
Cent. R.R. Co., 965 S.W.2d 594, 600 (Tex. App. 1998) (“Burnham involved a non-resident individual, 
and the Court specifically omitted any reference of personal jurisdiction regarding corporations.”); 
Conner, 944 S.W.2d at 413 (“Burnham does not speak to personal jurisdiction over foreign 
corporations.”). 
 194. 804 P.2d 627 (1991). 
 195. Id. at 630, 632. 
 196. Id. at 631 n.3. 
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corporation who is merely ‘present’ in Washington does not, without more, comport 
with due process.”197 
Of course, it is true that the defendant in Burnham was a natural person 
rather than a business entity. However, that fact merely demonstrates that a question 
exists; it does not provide the answer. While it is also true that no single opinion in 
Burnham garnered five votes, that objection rings hollow since at least eight justices 
so clearly agreed on the continuing validity of tag jurisdiction, even if they did so for 
different reasons. Indeed, a straightforward application of the test from Marks v. 
United States,198 which asks lower courts to divine a binding rule from a decision 
with no majority opinion by adhering to the “position taken by those Members [of 
the Court] who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds,”199 yields at 
least the conclusion that Burnham means tag jurisdiction remains generally valid.200 
Indeed, it is telling that no court appears to have used this justification to refrain from 
applying tag jurisdiction to any individual defendant.201 
B.  Courts Applying Tag Jurisdiction To Corporations 
Although the courts refusing to apply tag jurisdiction to corporations are in 
the majority, a few courts have readily cited Burnham to apply tag jurisdiction to 
corporations. 
For example, in Allied-Signal Inc. v. Purex Industries, Inc.,202 the Appellate 
Division of the New Jersey Superior Court allowed the exercise of jurisdiction over 
a non-resident corporation based solely on the in-state service of that corporation’s 
registered in-state agent.203 Citing Burnham, the court reasoned that although due 
process ordinarily “requires that a nonresident defendant ‘reasonably anticipate’ 
being sued in the forum state, presence of an individual defendant in the forum state 
accompanied by service, confers in personam jurisdiction.”204 The court also rejected 
the argument that Justice Scalia’s footnote somehow precluded the exercise of 
jurisdiction over corporations. The court argued that “Justice Scalia was not there 
 
 197. Id. Other courts have simply assumed Burnham does not apply to corporations with even less 
reasoning than in MBM Fisheries. See, e.g., Golden Scorpio Corp. v. Steel Horse Saloon I, No. CV-08-
1781-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 976598, at *3 n.4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 9, 2009) (dismissing the possibility of tag 
jurisdiction over a company in a footnote citing other cases doing the same); Gonzalez v. Vlassios 
Carriers, No. 90 CIV. 7979 (PNL), 1992 WL 350084, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1992) (“While it is true 
that such service on a natural person would confer the requisite personal jurisdiction, the same rule does 
not apply to corporations, whose personnel do not—as do those to be served for a partnership or 
association—carry the corporation around with them.”) (quotations and citations omitted). 
 198. 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
 199. Id. at 193 (quotations and citations omitted). 
 200. Although the Marks test has been criticized, see, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 
(2003), it has never been explicitly overruled and remains good law. See, e.g., Jackson v. Danberg, 594 
F.3d 210, 222–23 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying the Marks test). 
 201. See C.S.B. Commodities, Inc. v. Urban Trend LTD, 626 F. Supp. 2d 837, 846 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 
2009) (“Since Burnham was decided, there does not appear to be a single published opinion in which a 
court has found jurisdiction lacking where an individual was served in the forum.”). 
 202. 576 A.2d 942 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990). 
 203. Id. at 944–945. 
 204. Id. at 944 (citing Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 607–09 (1990)) (additional citation 
omitted). 
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referring to circumstances limiting state jurisdiction, but to circumstances expanding 
state jurisdiction and possibly unique to corporations, which obviously have no 
personal presence anywhere.”205 The court’s analysis did not turn on the existence 
of the registration statute, rather the court explicitly endorsed the idea that the 
principle in Burnham applies to corporations.206 
Other courts have accepted tag jurisdiction over entities, but done so with 
less analysis. For example, in First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP,207 the 
Second Circuit held that tag jurisdiction was applicable to a partnership where a 
partner was served while doing business on behalf of a related partnership in New 
York.208 The court did not delve too deeply into the implications of subjecting 
partnerships to tag jurisdiction, but did note that the New York had a long history of 
subjecting partnerships to jurisdiction on that basis, which accorded with Justice 
Scalia’s emphasis in Burnham on historical pedigree.209 In Northern Light 
Technology, Inc. v. Northern Lights Club,210 the First Circuit allowed the assertion 
of personal jurisdiction over a corporation through in-state service on a corporation’s 
president.211 The court did not fully analyze the constitutional issue and instead relied 
on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)(1)’s provision allowing personal service on 
the officer of a corporation to support its holding.212 Likewise, in Oyuela v. Seacor 
Marine (Nigeria), Inc.213, the Eastern District of Louisiana rejected the argument that 
tag jurisdiction could not be applied to a Bahamian corporation whose officer was 
served while present in Louisiana.214 The court simply noted that “Burnham’s 
reassertion of the general validity of transient jurisdiction provides no indication that 
it should only apply to natural persons.”215 At least one other court, although not 
explicitly endorsing tag jurisdiction over corporations, has cited Burnham for the 
proposition that the physical “presence” of a corporation through its occupation of 
office space can support the assertion of jurisdiction over that corporation.216 
 
 205. Allied-Signal, 576 A.2d at 944–945. 
 206. Id. at 944. 
 207. 154 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 208. Id. at 20–21. 
 209. Id. at 20 (“The rule that service upon a partner in New York subjects a partnership to personal 
jurisdiction is a venerable one.”). 
 210. 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 211. Id. at 63 n.10. 
 212. Id. The court also noted that in any event the defendants had waived the argument that service on 
the corporation’s president (who was also a defendant personally in the action) failed to establish service 
on the corporation. Id. 
 213. 290 F. Supp. 2d 713, 720 (E.D. La. 2003). 
 214. Id. at 719−20. 
 215. Id. at 720. The court in Oyuela also rested its holding on the alternative ground that the defendant 
satisfied the International Shoe test. Id. at 721–22. Curiously, the court did not cite or distinguish Wenche 
Siemer even though it was decided over a decade earlier and at least appears to suggest in dicta that the 
Fifth Circuit would not apply tag jurisdiction to corporations. See supra, Part IV.A. 
 216. See Demirs v. Plexicraft, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 250, 254 (D.R.I. 1990) (“This Court notes that 
although ‘minimum contacts’ has become the touchstone of in personam jurisdiction, presence of a 
defendant in the jurisdiction is still to be considered. See Burnham . . . . To the extent that the corporate 
defendant paid rent and thereby leased office space from the plaintiff, I find that the defendant established 
a physical presence within Rhode Island which adds support to the already strong case for jurisdiction in 
this forum.”) (footnote omitted). 
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While these courts reached the correct conclusion, they failed to adequately 
flesh out the doctrinal and theoretical justifications for applying tag jurisdiction to 
corporations. As the previous section explained, the doctrine as announced by the 
Court in Burnham provides strong support for the application of tag jurisdiction to 
corporations. However, as the next section will argue, the theoretical framework 
under which corporations have been granted constitutional rights on par with natural 
persons also augurs for subjecting corporations to tag jurisdiction. 
IV. CORPORATIONS AS PEOPLE 
The idea of holding corporations to similar standards of personal 
jurisdiction as natural persons may seem odd since there are obvious differences 
between natural persons and corporations. However, in many areas of the law, and 
in constitutional law in particular, the distinctions between corporations and natural 
persons has been eroded significantly. Since corporations now enjoy many of the 
benefits of constitutional personhood, it makes sense that they should also be treated 
similarly to natural persons for purposes of personal jurisdiction analysis under the 
Due Process Clause.217 
A.  Corporations Become People 
Corporations were not always thought of as equivalent to natural persons in 
the law. During the era immediately after the founding, courts still considered 
corporations creatures of the state’s creation that could not have any political 
rights.218 For example, in one early case the Supreme Court found that corporations 
could not even utilize federal courts.219 The Court found that as an “invisible, 
intangible, and artificial being,” a corporation was “certainly not a citizen; and, 
consequently, cannot sue or be sued in the courts of the United States.”220 This vision 
of a corporation was consistent with the idea in very early case law, discussed in Part 
III.A, supra, that a corporation, as a creature of the state, could not leave its state of 
incorporation for jurisdictional purposes. 
However, that attitude began to change as the role of corporations in society 
began to expand dramatically. At the time of the founding, there were only six non-
bank corporations in existence in the United States.221 By the time the Fourteenth 
 
 217. Cf. Michalski, supra note 80, at 130 (“[A] more robust understanding of corporate citizenship 
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Amendment was ratified, the corporate form had exploded in popularity, particularly 
for larger businesses.222 
Perhaps in response to these changes, the courts began to expand their 
conception of a corporation’s role under the law. No longer were corporations 
thought of as creatures of the state, but rather they were reconceived as the creation 
of a collection of private individuals.223 Scholars refer to this as the “aggregate 
theory” of corporate personhood.224 Under this “aggregate theory,” corporations 
could be more easily conceptualized as being present in places other than their place 
of incorporation since the people who make up a corporation can travel at will. This 
understanding led to the increasing acceptance of service of process on corporate 
agents present in other states on corporate business as a valid method for acquiring 
personal jurisdiction over corporations as discussed in Part III.A, supra.225 
However, while the prominence of the aggregate theory around the time of 
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment supports the application of tag 
jurisdiction to corporations under an originalist methodology,226 the relationship 
between corporations and the Constitution did not stop evolving there. Since that 
time, corporations have gone from being thought of as mere aggregations of natural 
persons, to entirely independent entities on virtually the same constitutional footing 
as natural persons. 
Starting in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, a theory of 
corporations as entities independent of the natural persons that make them up began 
to emerge.227 This theory is sometimes called the “real entity” theory by scholars.228 
In this era, courts began to accord corporations many constitutional rights including 
protection under the Equal Protection Clause229 and Due Process Clause230 of the 
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Fourteenth Amendment,231 the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment,232 and 
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.233 
Under this conception, corporations became nearly indistinguishable for 
constitutional purposes from actual persons. 
The trend of according corporations constitutional rights similar to natural 
persons has only accelerated in recent years.234 Most prominently, in Citizens United 
v. FEC,235 the Supreme Court held that a law prohibiting corporations from 
broadcasting electioneering communications in the days leading up to federal 
elections violated the First Amendment,236 overruling several earlier decisions 
allowing similar practices, including Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.237 
Although the Court had held before that the First Amendment protects speech by 
corporations,238 the Court’s reasoning in Citizens United strongly drove home the 
point that any differential treatment by the government of corporate speakers versus 
natural person speakers is invalid.239 The Court reinforced the idea that a corporation 
is much more than an aggregation of its owners; rather, it is a completely independent 
entity with its own right to influence the political process. The Court’s rejection of 
two of the government’s arguments in particular reflects its endorsement of this 
premise. 
First, the Court rejected the argument that a corporation’s ability under the 
statute to speak through an independent political action committee obviated the need 
to allow it to speak directly. The Court reasoned that “[a] PAC is a separate 
association from the corporation. So the PAC exemption from [the] expenditure ban 
does not allow the corporation to speak.”240 In essence, even though the PAC would 
have been controlled by the same people who controlled the corporation, it was no 
substitute because the PAC was not the same “person” as the corporation. Second, 
the Court rejected the argument that the government had an interest in preventing 
corporate speech that may be opposed by some of the corporation’s shareholders.241 
If a corporation were understood to be an aggregate of individuals, than its speech 
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rights and interests would merely be contiguous with that of its shareholders.242 
Instead, the Court advised aggrieved shareholders to take it up with the corporation’s 
governing structure—i.e., its officers and directors—if shareholders disagreed with 
the corporation’s speech.243 Thus, the Court strongly stood behind the view of 
corporations as constitutional persons with a right to express themselves through the 
officers and directors who control them, independent of even the corporation’s 
owners. 
But the Court did even more in Citizens United than firmly shut the door on 
the aggregate theory of corporate existence. The Court also rejected the idea that 
because the law is the source of a corporation’s existence the government may curtail 
corporate rights: 
Either as support for its antidistortion rationale or as a further 
argument, the Austin majority undertook to distinguish wealthy 
individuals from corporations on the ground that “[s]tate law 
grants corporations special advantages—such as limited liability, 
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and 
distribution of assets.” . . . This does not suffice, however, to allow 
laws prohibiting speech. It is rudimentary that the State cannot 
exact as the price of those special advantages the forfeiture of First 
Amendment rights.244 
This statement reflects the long journey corporations have made from being mere 
creatures of the state that could be regulated at will and could not even leave their 
home state in the founding era,245 to being entities that are not merely independent 
of the sovereign that gave them “life,” but are in fact protected from that sovereign 
(and the federal government) by the Constitution.246 
Citizens United is no outlier. Other recent cases in the Supreme Court and 
lower courts have adopted similar views in granting corporations constitutional 
protection including ‘negative’ free speech rights,247 rights under the Free Exercise 
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Clause,248 protection under the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause,249 the 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in criminal cases,250 and the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases.251 In addition, corporations have been 
afforded important statutory protection under several civil rights laws.252 Scholars 
have suggested that the list of rights afforded corporations may grow further as this 
new understanding of the corporation is applied to other constitutional provisions.253 
B.  Corporate Constitutional Persons Are Subject To Tag Jurisdiction 
The expansion of corporate rights via an embrace of the natural entity 
theory of the corporation supports the application of tag jurisdiction to corporations 
for at least two reasons. First, the understanding of a corporation as an entity 
independent of its shareholders or the state is consistent with the idea of corporations 
being present wherever their officers are conducting corporate business. Second, it 
would be fundamentally unfair and inconsistent with the precedents expanding 
corporate rights to afford corporations greater rights than natural persons enjoy 
under the Due Process Clause by exempting corporations from tag jurisdiction. 
As described above, recent cases have embraced the idea that corporations 
are independent entities rather than aggregations of their shareholders or creatures of 
the state’s creation. This theory of corporate personhood logically aligns with the 
application of tag jurisdiction to corporations. In Citizens United the Court did not 
equate the political views of a corporation with those of its shareholders (or 
employees) but rather with the views of those running the corporation (i.e., its 
officers and directors). Tag jurisdiction similarly equates the presence of a 
corporation to the presence of its officers or directors, rather than to the presence of 
employees or shareholders. Just as officers can make decisions about what a 
corporation will say254 for constitutional purposes, so too can they make decisions 
about where a corporation will be. 
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The entity theory of corporate personhood also eliminates any meaningfully 
distinction between corporations and natural persons in terms of their ability to travel 
between fora. If corporations were mere creations of their state of origin, it might be 
reasonable to argue that a corporation would need to do something more 
comprehensive than a natural person in order to “leave” that state and enter another 
one. However, though corporations may still be created by states, they now enjoy the 
ability to come and go as they please. Moreover, unlike in the past, a corporate officer 
can now, in a very real sense, carry her authority as a corporate officer with her when 
she conducts business in another state. This is particularly true in jurisdictions that 
follow the fiduciary shield doctrine, forbidding courts from exercising jurisdiction 
over corporate agents based on the actions agents take while present in a forum solely 
as agents of the corporation.255 Thus, the officer is in some instances not himself or 
herself at all for jurisdictional purposes when he or she enters a forum on the 
corporation’s behalf, but instead becomes entirely a vessel for corporate presence. 
Once an officer traveling at the corporation’s behest is understood this way, it would 
be inconsistent with the notions of state sovereignty undergirding recent Supreme 
Court personal jurisdiction cases256 to allow a corporation to travel deliberately from 
one state to another while avoiding the sovereign authority of the destination state. 
As many scholars have recognized, the expansion of corporate rights and 
the embrace of the natural entity theory also augurs for increased corporate 
responsibility in other areas of law.257 In the personal jurisdiction context, Professor 
Roger Michalski has argued that the increased protection corporations have received 
under the Constitution should be taken into account in examining personal 
jurisdiction under the International Shoe framework.258 Professor Michalski 
proposes that the exercise of the political rights granted by these recent court 
decisions should be a relevant “contact” for purposes of determining whether the 
minimum contacts test is satisfied259 
This makes sense in the context of the International Shoe framework: the 
contacts made when exercising political rights are just as probative a measure of a 
corporation’s connection to the forum as business contacts. Indeed, under current 
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doctrine, it is likely already the case that a corporation’s political activity would be 
a relevant contact in determining personal jurisdiction.260 Professor Michalski 
soundly argues that such activities are a legitimate consideration in personal 
jurisdiction based on a hypothetical consent theory in which “artificial and real 
persons acquire political obligations because they would have agreed to take on these 
obligations, if asked, in order to secure [their] rights and freedoms.”261 
However, it is important to recognize that my argument is distinct from this 
one. Corporations should not bear the burden of tag jurisdiction because of a 
hypothetical trade they have made for the “benefit” of constitutional rights. Rather, 
corporations should be subject to tag jurisdiction because of the methodological 
approach courts took in order to afford corporations constitutional rights: equating 
corporations with natural persons.262 
If corporations are equals to natural persons, then they should be afforded 
(at most) equivalent constitutional rights to natural persons, not greater rights. The 
holding in Burnham is that the Due Process Clause does not protect a natural person 
from being subject to jurisdiction on the basis of only their temporary presence in 
another state. Since corporations are now considered the equivalent of a natural 
person for purposes of most constitutional provisions (including the Due Process 
Clause), there is no reason why they should be given greater protection under the 
Due Process Clause than that to which a natural person is entitled—including in the 
context of tag jurisdiction.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
As many have argued, it may be unfair or otherwise bad policy to continue 
to have tag jurisdiction.263 It also may be unwise or even a threat to democracy to 
continue to afford corporations constitutional rights akin to natural persons.264 But, 
as long as we are going to have tag jurisdiction and corporate constitutional persons, 
corporations should be subject to tag jurisdiction just like the rest of us.265 
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